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PEONAGE AND CONTRACTUAL LIBERTY
Aziz Z. Huq
Supreme Courtjurisprudenceconcerning the Thirteenth Amendment is
sparse. However, in 1911 and 1914, the Court decided two cases concerning peonage laws: laws that had the effect of extracting laborfrom blacks
under threat of criminal sanction. Although the Court in this epoch was
typically hostile to claims of racialsubordination, in both these cases, black
litigants won. This Note argues that these cases are best understood in light
offreedom of contractjurisprudence. In particular,freedom of contract theory suggested an understandingof coercion that was transplanted into the
Thirteenth Amendment context. Recent case law suggests that this theory
persists in the Court's understandingof the Thirteenth Amendment.
INTRODUCTION

The Thirteenth Amendment's promise of relief from "slavery [and]
involuntary servitude"' has borne little fruit, unlike its contemporaneous
kin the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 2 The impotence of an
Amendment drafted to remedy the economic subjugation of African3
Americans is ironic in light of the persistent income gap between races.
This Note analyzes a rare instance of expansive Thirteenth Amendment
articulation-cases involving peonage. 4 These cases diverged from the
1. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
2. See Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 1, 2 (1995) (arguing that "constitutional law professors view the Amendment as
having historical meaning only"); Lauren Kares, Note, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A
Constitutional Amendment in Search of a Doctrine, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 372, 372 (1995)
(asserting that "the Thirteenth Amendment is notable for its lack of a coherent
jurisprudence").
3. On the political context of the Thirteenth Amendment's drafting and ratification,
see Guyora Binder, Did the Slaves Author the Thirteenth Amendment? An Essay in
Redemptive History, 5 Yale J.L. & Human. 471, 484-87 (1993) (describing the role of the
slaves' values in the elaboration of the Thirteenth Amendment); William E. Forbath, Caste,
Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1999) [hereinafter Forbath, Caste,
Class, and Equal Citizenship] (noting that "Republicans . . . celebrated the Thirteenth
Amendment as a charter of free labor"); Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 437, 438 (1989) (noting that many
congressmen "envisioned the [Thirteenth] Amendment as a charter for labor freedom").
On the persistence of racial inequality, see Chuck Collins & Felice Yeskel, Economic
Apartheid in America: A Primer on Economic Inequality and Insecurity 43-46 (1999)
(quantifying the racial component of economic inequality in the United States); William
Julius Wilson, The Bridge over the Racial Divide: Rising Inequality and Coalition Politics
12-39 (1999) (reviewing the role of race in rising economic inequality).
4. See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219
(1911).
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Progressive Era pattern ofjudicial hostility to minority claims, 5 while having only a limited impact on the quotidian reality of race relations. 6 This
Note argues that these cases' divergence from their era's racial hostility
and their limited impact can be explained by viewing them as instances of
"interest convergence," wherein the dominant (white) ideology informing the court happened to coincide with the needs of black workers. 7 In
Derrick Bell's words, "[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality
[is] accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites." 8
Specifically, the Supreme Court pressed the Thirteenth Amendment into
the service of liberty of contract doctrine to solve a pressing ideological
problem.
The ideological crisis addressed in cases involving peonage arose
from a disjunction between the era's liberty of contract ideology and its
economic realities: At the close of the nineteenth century, rapid industrialization, increasing concentration of capital, and a shrinking share of
returns for labor produced industrial unrest and periodic depression. 9
Claims that wage labor was coercive were pervasive, often being invoked
to justify redistributive legislation.1 0 Laborers claimed to be coerced by
the wage labor system;"' women claimed to be coerced by their physical
frailty. 12 The pervasiveness of coercion rhetoricjarred with the dominant
vision of liberty of contract as the sine qua non of fair and just social
3
ordering.'
Courts struggled to restrain legislative redistribution, to limit claims
of economic coercion, and to preserve laissez-faire's ideological coherence. Relying on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
5. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (noting that segregation may
"stamp[ ] the colored race with a badge of inferiority" solely because "the colored 'race'
chooses to put that construction upon it"); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)
(implying that the time had come when blacks "cease[ ] to be the special favorite of the
laws").
6. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
7. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence
Dilemma, in Critical Race Theory 20, 22 (Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
Bell discusses how the desegregation decisions of the 1950s and 1960s can be explained by
a convergence between longstanding efforts by the NAACP and others, on the one hand,
and white elites' policymaking interests on the other. See id. at 22-23.
8. Id. at 22.
9. See generally Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution
1863-1877, at 460-69 (1988) [hereinafter Foner, Reconstruction] (discussing the rapid
industrialization of the post-Civil War North).
10. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Limits of Freedom of Contract in the Age of
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, in The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract 103, 109-10
(F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (discussing how anxiety over the growth of corporate power led to
an increase in labor regulation).
11. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (invalidating a Kansas law that
prohibited employers from requiring that workers promise not to join a union).
12. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416 (1908) (validating a statute that restricted
the number of hours women could work).
13. See infra Part I.B.
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they invalidated labor regulations as violations of the freedom to contract: Only if contracting was voluntary, and sheltered from redistributive
14
legislation, would the market produce fair and equitable outcomes.
Confronted by workers' claims of coercion, the Court sought a substantive theory to limit cognizable coercion, without disrupting laissez-faire
theory's insistence on voluntary contracting.
The Court solved this coercion problem by labeling some categories
of plaintiffs-principally blacks and women-as per se vulnerable to coercion, and refusing other claims. 15 This definition of coercion spilled over
into the Thirteenth Amendment when the Court interpreted the phrase
"involuntary servitude" in Bailey v. Alabama and United States v. Reynolds
(together called "the Peonage cases").16 Previously, the Court had refused to find meaningful protection against racial subordination in the
Reconstruction Amendments. In the Civil Rights Cases, for instance, it
found that the Thirteenth Amendment provided no protection against
private discrimination, since it "simply abolished slavery."' 7 In the Peon14. See Clyde E. Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts: The Influence of Thomas M.
Cooley, Christopher G. Tiedeman, and John F. Dillon Upon American Constitutional Law
65-97 (1954) (reviewing the ascendancy of anti-regulatory jurisprudence in state and
federal courts after 1889); Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court 179-82
(1993) (discussing the pre-Lochner development of liberty of contract).
15. The place of paternalism in a non-market ordering has been noted by other
authors. See Alexander, supra note 10, at 118 ("By limiting interference with contractual
freedom to discrete instances of vulnerability that posed risks for the proper social order,
the Court sought to accommodate the new ethic of liberty of contract with vestiges of the
inherited proprietarian tradition."); Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and LaissezFaire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 L. & Hist. Rev. 250,
255 (1987) (arguing that during the Lochner era, the Court became "the ultimate
paternalist[ ]" even as it tried "tenaciously to root[ ] out paternalism"). Both Soifer and
Alexander identify the link between the acceptable regulations and the Court's
preconceived ideas of which classes were vulnerable. Neither links the Court's paternalism
with the ideological and political needs of laissez-faire ideology and practice. Indeed,
Alexander argues both that the Court sought to define "legitimately" protective legislation
and that these boundaries coincided with an older "proprietarian tradition." Alexander,
supra note 10, at 116. This Note, on the other hand, argues that paternalism and racism
are not only compatible with, but are constitutive of, capitalist market ordering.
16. 219 U.S. 219 (1911); 235 U.S. 133 (1914). Bailey and Reynolds are not the only
peonage cases. However, they are the most interesting and hence are the focus of this
Note. For other Supreme Court confrontations with peonage, see Pollock v. Williams, 322
U.S. 4, 18-20 (1944) (striking down a Florida statute that "as a practical matter"
reinstituted peonage); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942) (invalidating, pursuant to
Bailey, a Georgia statute that criminalized acceptance of a contract under false pretenses);
Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (invalidating a peonage prosecution); Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1, 20 (1906) (reversing a peonage conviction); Clyatt v. United
States, 197 U.S. 207, 222 (1905) (overturning a peonage prosecution because "there is not
a scintilla of testimony to show that [the alleged peons] were ever theretofore in a
condition of peonage").
17. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883); see also id. at 20-25 (noting that
private acts of discrimination have "nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude").
The Privileges or Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also received a
crushing blow in the Slaughter-House Cases on federalism grounds, ending the possibility of
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age cases, however, the Court invalidated two state statutes designed to
coerce labor from indigent, usually African-American, laborers by placing
them in peonage. 18 This Note argues-principally through the historical
context and language of the Peonage cases-that Bailey and Reynolds are
best understood as corollaries of laissez-faire ideology, and not as the beginning of minority-friendly jurisprudence departing from the pattern of
Plessy and the Civil Rights Cases.19 The Court's acquiescence to minorities' claims is best explained by the fortuitous convergence of dominant
ideological interests and otherwise unheard pleas for racial justice.
Peonage involved "a man indebted to an employer" and forced,
under pain of criminal punishment, to continue laboring for that employer. 20 In neither of the Peonage cases did the law in question explicitly fashion a peonage bond. The false pretenses law at issue in Bailey
defined acceptance of an advance and the subsequent failure to repay it
as prima facie evidence of fraud; the criminal surety law in Reynolds allowed third parties to pay convicted criminals' fines in return for their
future labor.2 1 Both, in the context of a racist and oppressive criminal
justice system, 22 effectively bound black labor to employers at little cost to
using it as a shield from racial injustice. The Slaughter-HouseCases themselves involved the
claims of white butchers that a municipally mandated monopoly had deprived them of
their trade, and violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78-79 (1872) (finding that an interpretation that "radically changes the
whole theory of relations of the State and Federal governments" was not intended by the
Amendment's framers or ratifiers). Notwithstanding the "almost crushing weight of
conventional wisdom," one recent commentator has argued that Slaughter-House'svision of
the Privileges or Immunities clause as protective of "'uniquely federal' rights" still might
provide some significant leverage. Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism
Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 Yale L.J. 643, 648, 650 (2000).
18. While many immigrants fell into peonage briefly, blacks bore "the major burden
of Southern peonage." Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South
1901-1969, at 108 (1972) [hereinafter Daniel, Shadow of Slavery].
19. But see Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 Vand.
L. Rev. 881, 921-30 (1998) (arguing that the Peonage cases are instances of minimalist
constitutional interpretation in furtherance of blacks' interests). Both Klarman and
Professor Benno Schmidt view the Peonage cases as inklings of a minority-friendly
jurisprudence, through which blacks started to make incremental gains. For an assessment
of Schmidt's position, see infra note 164 and accompanying text.
20. Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, supra note 18, at x. Daniel notes that "no thorough
investigation of peonage ever revealed even an approximate estimate of black peons." Id.
at 108. However, in one of his case studies, Daniel notes that in one Georgia county
(Jasper) "most of the ... planters . .. were guilty of peonage." Id. at 129.
21. See Alexander M. Bickel & Benno C. SchmidtJr., A History of the Supreme Court
Volume IX: The Judiciary and Responsible Government, 1910-21, at 856-58, 882-83
(1984). Only in Louisiana was simple breach of an employment contract criminal. See id.
at 854.
22. See David M. Oshinsky, "Worse Than Slavery": Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of
Jim Crow Justice 31-34, 124-33 (1996) (sketching the emergence of a new lawenforcement regime after the Civil War, which involved "keeping the ex-slaves in line," and
describing criminal justice in turn-of-the-century Mississippi); Katheryn K. Russell, The
Color of Crime 14-25 (1998) (describing ways in which the Southern criminal justice
system targeted blacks).
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the latter. Both laws were mere cogs in a complex machinery of "customs
and laws" designed to retain cheap labor for turpentine farms, cotton
farms, and railway construction. 23 Both continued de facto slavery. In
both cases, the Court struck down state law components of this system on
grounds that resembled rationales used in laissez-faire jurisprudence.
Part I of this Note outlines the historical context of the Peonage
cases, sketching conditions in the labor market and focusing on the
South. The laissez-faire theory of limited government is then outlined.
Part II reviews Lochner-era substantive due process cases concerning women and white laborers to illuminate judicial understandings of coercion. Changing judicial attitudes toward women illustrate the culturally
contingent nature of market baselines. The final Part analyzes the Peonage cases as products of the same notion of coercion, again hinging on
the Justices' understanding of African-Americans' place in the labor market. Examination of a contemporary Thirteenth Amendment case sug24
gests that traces of this framework persist.
I. BUILDING THE FREE MARKET IN PRACTICE AND IN THEORY

This Part sketches post-Civil War labor relations. The jurisprudential
framework used to understand economic legislation, as it evolved from
Thomas Cooley and Christopher Tiedeman to the courts, is then examined. Judicial theory diverged from the reality of the labor market
because of the prevalence of coerced (non-voluntary) transactions in the
23. Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, supra note 18, at ix; see also id. at 21-22 (discussing
prevalence of peonage through the entire South, and the difficulties inhering in
measuring its spread); Martha A. Myers, Race, Labor, & Punishment in the New South
225-27 (1998) (comparing trends in incarceration of blacks and whites in Georgia
between the Civil War and the Second World War to conclude that "punishment of black
men.., was more firmly linked than comparable white punishments to economic events
and conditions"). Another instance of oppressive labor law was the convict lease system,
whereby blacks arrested on minor offenses were hired out by the state as cheap labor. See
Alex Lichtenstein, Twice the Work of Free Labor: The Political Economy of Convict Labor
in the New South 10-12 (1996); see also Myers, supra, at 15-21 (describing the growth of
the convict lease system in Georgia after the Civil War); Oshinsky, supra note 22, at 70-84
(describing convict leasing in Tennessee, Florida, and Alabama in coal mines and
turpentine farms).
24. Alternative jurisprudentialmodels are not considered at length here as extensive
discussion exists elsewhere. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10
Const. Comment. 403, 407 (1993) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment should not be
subject to a state action requirement and that it should apply "when private economic
power is used in racially perverse ways"); Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child
Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1359,
1383-84 (1992) (applying the Thirteenth Amendment paradigm to the parent-child
relation); Cynthia A. Bailey, Workfare and Involuntary Servitude-What You Wanted to
Know But Were Afraid to Ask, 15 B.C. Third World L.J. 285, 316-21 (1995) (arguing that
workfare assignments are a form of involuntary servitude); Binder, supra note 3, at 492-99
(discussing the interpretive choices demanded by the Thirteenth Amendment); Julie A.
Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 Geo J. on Fighting Poverty 340, 354-55 (1994) (comparing
workfare to involuntary servitude).
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labor market. This Part closes by suggesting why coercion was conceptually difficult for judges.
A. Postbellum Economic Development
1. Labor Unrest and "Wage Slavery" in Northern Industry. - War's close
and Reconstruction witnessed an expansion in the North's economy and
the growth of a "powerful class of industrialists and railroad entrepreneurs."2 5 Radical Republicanism, with roots in antebellum Free Labor
and Free Soil parties, prospered momentarily, 2 6 but soon foundered as
the Republican Party drifted from the principles of Southern Reconstruction toward a pro-business liberalism. 27 Disillusioned by well-publicized
corruption, particularly in Southern Reconstruction regimes, "liberal reformers who had once exalted the power of the activist state.., attacked
the 'fallacy of attempts to benefit humanity by legislation.' 28 When the
Northern Pacific Railroad's financial problems triggered the 1870s depression, labor unrest accelerated, culminating in the Great Strike of
25. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 460.
By 1873, the nation's industrial production stood 75% above its 1865 level, a
figure all the more remarkable in view of the South's economic stagnation.... By
1873, with the United States second only to Britain in manufacturing production
and the number of farmers outstripped by nonagricultural workers, the North
had irrevocably entered the industrial age.
Id. at 461. This is not, however, to suggest that industrial development was taking place
solely in the North or that agricultural activities were confined to the South. See id. at
462-66 (discussing the agrarian development of the Midwest); Jonathon M. Wiener, Social
Origins of the New South: Alabama, 1860-1885, at 209-14 (1978) [hereinafter Wiener,
Social Origins] (discussing the genealogy of Reconstruction boosters of industry in the
South).
26. See Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican
Party Before the Civil War 11-39 (1970) (discussing original free labor ideals).
27. See Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 466, 500 (noting the reforms that took
place within the Republican Party that precipitated the "growing connection of Republican
leaders with business corporations"); see also William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free
Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 767, 786-90 [hereinafter
Forbath, Ambiguities] (describing the unraveling of "Free Labor" Republicanism in the
face of growing labor unrest). Power also shifted away from the Republican Party. See 2
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 247 (1998) (charting the swing toward
the Democrats). Foner notes elsewhere that Abolitionists were never sympathetic to
labor's allegations of "wage slavery," since they diluted the attack of racial slavery. See Eric
Foner, The Meaning of Freedom in the Age of Emancipation, 81 J. Am. Hist. 435, 448
(1994) [hereinafter Foner, Meaning of Freedom]. This is one part of the "bitter debates of
the Reconstruction era [that] revolved in large measure around the definition of freedom
in the aftermath of emancipation." Id. at 454.
28. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 492; see id. at 497-99 (noting increasing
disillusionment with the project of Southern Reconstruction). In particular, blacks in the
Reconstruction regimes were seen as barriers to effective administration since they would
never support limiting government services: "[A] remarkable reversal of sympathies took
place, with Southern whites increasingly portrayed as victims of injustice, while blacks were
deemed unfit to exercise suffrage." Id. at 499; cf. W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, Reconstruction
and its Benefits, 15 Am. Hist. Rev. 781, 789 (1910) (noting that "[t]he chief charges against
the negro governments are extravagance, theft, and incompetency of officials").
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1877.29 The labor unions leading such protests, such as the Knights of
Labor, found themselves pitched against an increasingly powerful alliance of "the new industrial bourgeoisie [with] the Republican Party and
the national state." 30 Further strikes followed, with gradually stronger
showings by Populists in national polls. 3 1 Business interests responded
fiercely, with an increasingly critical view of labor demands and a gathering insistence upon the unfettered operation of market forces.3 2 Casting
aside the travails of maintaining the Union and the moral ardor of the
33
Radical cause, the North plunged into full-fledged class struggle.
Union growth attests to a pervasive sentiment that Reconstruction
remained "unfinished."3 4 In particular, artisans and skilled factory workers suffered as they "found themselves competing against new machines
and new unskilled and underpaid workers." 35 Factories expanded and
37
became more common. 36 Workers endured long hours and low wages,
a condition of oppression and penury often explicitly analogized to slav29.

See Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 512-19, 583-85.
30. Id. at 584; see also Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law
1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 65 (1992) (noting that "the Great Railroad

Strike of 1877 triggered a pervasive fear that, by succumbing to the disease of the
European class struggle, America had finally been drawn into the bitter cycles of European
history"); William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 Harv. L.
Rev. 1109, 1121-25 (1989) (describing the various groups within the labor movement
during the Gilded Age, and focusing on the largest and most radical, the Knights of
Labor); Peter Kolchin, The Business Press and Reconstruction, 1865-1868, 33 J. S. Hist.
183, 190 (1967) (describing the business press's hostility toward Radical projects)
[hereinafter Kolchin, Business Press].
31. See Horwitz, supra note 30, at 65-66.
32. The Northern urban press, according to Foner, described labor leaders as
"'enemies of society' . . . . and insisted the laws of political economy dictated only one way
out of the depression: 'Things must regulate themselves.'" Foner, Reconstruction, supra
note 9, at 517-19. The urban bourgeoisie, which was moving rapidly to the right,
welcomed the Depression as "'not an unmixed evil' since it promised to lower wages,
discipline labor, and curb the power of unions." Id. at 518.
33. See Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that
"the Labor question eclipsed the Slavery Question in the politics of the rapidly
industrializing postbellum North").
34. Id. at 30; see also David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor 5 (1987)
(noting that union membership quadrupled between 1897 and 1903); David Montgomery,
Workers' Control in America 93-101 (1981) (charting the use of strikes after 1900).
Nevertheless, union growth never crystallized into political power. See Seymour Martin
Upset and Gary Marks, It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States
100-07 (2000) (explaining the failure of unionist efforts to form an alliance with a political
party). Lipset and Marks further note that one reason for labor's failure at political log
rolling was the "intense mutual hostility" between the Socialist party and the American
Federation of Labor. Id. at 123.
35. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 3, at 28.
36. See Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom 117 (1998) [hereinafter Foner,
Story of Freedom] (noting that by 1900 "nearly half the laborers in manufacturing worked
in establishments with more than 250 employees").
37. Although real wages rose in this period, monetary deflation and falling prices
meant that "much of the working class remained desperately poor." Id. at 117. According
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ery.38 Just as the Nation celebrated free labor's triumph over feudal relations, legislatures and courts were flooded with allegations of a fresh
mode of servitude resulting directly from free markets: Industrial workers saw their working conditions as "wage slavery," wherein "the 'lash of
9
gold' fell not on 'one slave alone,' but on 'the backs of millions.'"
White workers articulated this fear of becoming slaves through racial violence: In strikes and racial programs, white workers, such as longshoremen on the New York City docks, would attempt to purge theirjobs of the
"'taint of blackness"' by "driv[ing] blacks from the labor market altogether and, in the process, redefin[ing] the jobs they appropriated as
41
'white." 40 The labor regulations challenged in cases such as Lochner,
Coppage,42 and Adair4 3 responded to such ferment in the labor market by
attempting to ameliorate the inequitable distribution of surplus profits
between labor and capital.
2. Persistent Unfree Labor in the South. - In parts of the South, 44 unfree forms of labor flourished alongside racial violence and disenfranchisement. 45 Postbellum labor relations in many parts of the South
to Foner, the depressions of the 1870s and 1890s affected the poor particularly harshly.
See id. at 121.
38. This tradition finds foundations in the hopes inspired by the Thirteenth
Amendment's passage. "Labor spokesmen referred to the Thirteenth Amendment as a
'glorious labor amendment' that enshrined the dignity of labor in the Constitution and
whose prohibition of involuntary servitude was violated by court injunctions undermining
the right to strike." Id. at 124-27 (discussing in addition the resurgence of discussions of
"wage slavery"). Indeed, the drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment had argued that "the
degradation of one worker was the degradation of all working people." Vandervelde,
supra note 3, at 445.
39. Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the
Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation 84-86 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
Stanley notes that labor activists refined the abolitionist critique of slavery, arguing against
freedom of contract that "a man with his labor cannot be bought and sold, without
recognizing slavery as a right." Id. at 90 (internal citations omitted); see also Foner,
Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 477-79 (noting that union campaigns focused on "wage
slavery"); Foner, Story of Freedom, supra note 36, at 143 (noting that the term "wage
slavery" was in popular currency at least until 1919); Forbath, Ambiguities, supra note 27,
at 813-14 ("The Reconstruction legislation and amendments affirmed that the condition
of a laboring class was of constitutional moment. .. ").
40. Bruce Nelson, Divided We Stand: American Workers and the Struggle for Black
Equality 20-21 (2001). Nelson describes how Irish longshoremen would establish their
white identity by "creating social and psychological distance between themselves and
African-Americans and, as a first priority, severing the occupational and residential ties that
linked the two groups in the popular imagination." Id. at 200.
41. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
43. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
44. This section is intended to give a brief survey of developments in the Southern
labor market and hence does not do justice to the heterogeneity of the postbellum
Southern experience. The sources cited in the footnotes provide specific instances of
region-by-region analysis of Southern agriculture and industry.
45. See J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the
Undoing of the Second Reconstruction 23-25 (1999) (documenting techniques used
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thus approximated slavery in substance, if not in legal form. While antebellum slavery had often been portrayed as absolute and literal domination, 46 recent historal work has emphasized the surprising incidence of
negotiation, in which passive resistance and maroonage, subtly and at the
edges, eroded planters' dominance. 47 While the practice of slavery varied
immensely between different parts of the South, in a handful of instances
slaves contested, occasionally successfully, "the organization of labor, the
hours and pace of work, the sexual division of labor, and the composition
48
of the labor force."
Emancipation strengthened the hand of black labor without fundamentally altering this economic ordering. 49 Negotiations between black
laborers and white landowners still occurred against a backdrop of immense inequality. Some planters failed to inform slaves of Emancipation;50 others attempted to reestablish plantation-like labor arrange-

during Redemption to disenfranchise blacks); Oshinsky, supra note 22, at 23-29
(describing Klan violence in Mississippi after Emancipation).
46. The plantation social order "conceded nearly everything to the slaveowner and
nothing to the slave." Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of
Slavery in North America 97-100 (1998); see also Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll:
The World the Slaves Made 25-49 (1974) (describing the legal ordering of master-slave
relations).
47. Berlin documents a plethora of fronts upon which resistance took place.
Maroonage, for instance, was the practice of fleeing plantations for encampments of
former slaves and Indians in the wild. See Berlin, supra note 46, at 169-71 (noting that "in
the Chesapeake, slaves found truancy a powerful weapon in the struggle to maintain
control over their own lives"). Berlin also notes that slaves expressed considerable
antipathy and resistance toward the task system. See id. at 166-67. In Louisiana, a shadow
slave economy developed with slaves finding "a measure of independence in the cartage
trades." Id. at 201-11; see also id. at 269-72, 276-77 (describing independent slave
economies in Maryland and Virginia); Genovese, supra note 46, at 5 ("The slaves of the
Old South displayed impressive solidarity and collective resistance to their masters. .. ").
48. Berlin, supra note 46, at 11. Across the South, "slaves created new economies and
societies that tried to protect them from the harshest aspects of the slave regime." Id. at
215.
49. See Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground:
Maryland during the Nineteenth Century 167 (1985) (noting that "nowhere did a new
order arise immediately from the ashes of the old," but arguing that Reconstruction
nonetheless fostered real change); see also id. at 175 (noting that land redistribution was
rare in Maryland). A brief exception occurred in 1863 in the Sea Islands of South
Carolina, where a group of antislavery missionaries from New York worked with freedmen
to establish a system of tiding and black landownership. See Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal for
Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment 272-96 (1964) (describing the partitioning of
land among former slaves). This experiment ended when, pursuant to President
Johnson's orders, "regular military forces seized control [and] restor[ed] the lands to their
late owners." Id. at 357.
50. See Oshinsky, supra note 22, at 16; Pete Daniel, The Metamorphosis of Slavery,
1865-1900, in 3 From Slavery to Sharecropping: White Land and Black Labor in the Rural
South 1865-1900, at 64, 66 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994) [hereinafter Daniel, The
Metamorphosis of Slavery].
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ments.5 1 Through the Black Codes, early postbellum Southern
legislatures attempted openly to "reinstitut[e] the law of master and servant for African Americans." 5 2 Little land redistribution actually occurred, 53 except in isolated and anomalous pockets such as the South
Carolina Sea Islands and at Davis Bend in Mississippi. 54 Legal impediments to increased productivity reduced blacks' incentive to invest in
skills, 5 5 so most blacks remained in the lower echelons of the labor mar56
ket, mostly as sharecroppers and tenant farmers.
Ironically, the Freedman's Bureau, a federal agency established to
aid the former slaves, entrenched initial black disadvantage in the labor
market. 57 Its agents stressed the "solemn obligation of contracts," declaring that "if [former slaves] can be induced to enter into contracts, they
are taught that there are duties as well as privileges of freedom. 5 8s In
51. See David Montgomery, Black Workers and Republicans in the South, in Civil
Rights Since 1787: A Reader on the Black Struggle 141, 144 (Jonathon Birnbaum &
Clarence Taylor eds., 2000) (noting how sharecropping developed as a way of retaining a
plantation-like system in the context of planter illiquidity in 1866).
52. Id. at 143.
53. See Rose, supra note 49, at 349-52 (describing President Johnson's failure to
confiscate land from former slaveholders); Du Bois, supra note 28, at 784 (same). This is
true of the Republican and later Redemption governments. See Montgomery, supra note
51, at 142 ("Even though the Depression of the 1870s threw vast tracts of southern land
into state hands through tax defaults, most of that acreage made its way back to former
owners.").
54. See Janet Sharp Hermann, The Pursuit of a Dream 109-216 (1981) (describing
the failed attempt of Benjamin Montgomery, a former slave of Joseph Davis, who was
Jefferson Davis's brother, to establish a "black, cooperative community"); Rose, supra note
49, at 272-96 (discussing the division of land in the South Carolina Sea Islands).
55. "Because the black laborer perceived that the market limited his opportunities
due to his race, and that the true nature of his skills, experience, and abilities were never
measured or tested, he had little incentive to invest in measures which might improve his
productivity." R. Sutch & R. Ransom, The Ex-Slave in the Post-Bellum South: A Study of
the Economic Impact of Racism in a Market Environment, in 3 From Slavery to
Sharecropping, supra note 50, at 323, 337.
56. See, e.g., Fields, supra note 49, at 176-81 (describing the position of black farmers
in Maryland in the 1880s). This occurred in the context of the breakup of the plantation
system and the advent of sharecropping. See Ralph Shlomowitz, The Origins of Southern
Sharecropping, in 3 From Slavery to Sharecropping, supra note 50, at 199, 216 (describing
the post-War progression from a centralized gang system of agricultural labor to a tenant
sharecropping system).
57. See Wiener, Social Origins, supra note 25, at 47 (noting that the Bureau "became
part of the repressive apparatus of the new agricultural system"). "[F]ederal officials
[especially the Freedman's Bureau] often cooperated directly with planters" in Alabama.
Peter Kolchin, First Freedom: The Response of Alabama's Blacks to Emancipation and
Reconstruction 33 (1972) [hereinafter Kolchin, First Freedom].
58. Stanley, supra note 39, at 36 (1998) (noting that part of the educational programs
launched by the Freedman's bureau were "little talks" in which the sanctity of the contract
bond was exalted). Reconstruction "ideas of freedom were disseminated through the
language of contract." Id. at 2. Extending the rights of contractual freedom to former
slaves was part of the "Americaniz[ing] of the blacks." Eric Foner, Reconstruction
Revisited, 10 Rev. Am. Hist. 82, 87 (1982).
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stressing

contracts, the Bureau did contest the views of
. . unwilling to bargain with free blacks as equals" 5 9
because they persistently feared the threat of black "'insolence' and 'insubordination."' 60 The emphasis on contract nonetheless had pernicious effects. Contracts at first required that "the negro [sic] promises to work
for an indefinite time for nothing but his board and clothes, and the
white man agrees to do nothing." 61 Nevertheless, the Bureau strongly
encouraged blacks to enter year-long contracts. 62 In the South Carolina
Sea Islands, for instance, freedmen who had fleetingly tasted land tenure
were evicted, and those "freedmen who refused to make contracts were
forced to leave." 63 In other parts of the South, such as Alabama, black
tenant farmers became peons after being "[d]efrauded of their wages
and deprived of mobility either by threats that they could not legally
move until their debts were paid or by actual force." 64 Forced work on
plantations and mandatory contracts for blacks thus persisted in many
parts of the South, intensifying after Redemption. 65 Changes in Southern industry also brought cold comfort. Coal mines and turpentine farms
in Georgia, Florida, and Alabama exploited and strengthened the "iso-

"southerners .

Dependency on the state and idleness, claimed the Bureau, vitiated freedom, and
fostered a new slavery. The Union army forged fresh contracts for slaves to work on
plantations, assigning soldiers to maintain discipline over liberated slaves even before the
end of the war. See Stanley, supra note 39, at 35.
The lack of a definitive constitutional resolution of the interpretive question even
at this date may help to explain why the United States Army, and in certain cases
agents of the Freedman's Bureau, could believe that they were introducing a "free
labor" system into the South even as they went about providing for the criminal
enforcement, in numerous cases, of the labor contracts of former slaves.
Robert J. Steinfeld, Changing Legal Conceptions of Free Labor, in Terms of Labor:
Slavery, Serfdom, and Free Labor 137, 151 (Stanley L. Engerman ed., 1999).
59. Stanley, supra note 39, at 41 (quoting a former slaveholder as saying: "No nigger
knew what a contract was and would keep one unless forced to"); see also Dan T. Carter,
When the War Was Over: The Failure of Self-Reconstruction in the South, 1865-1867, at
149 (1985) ("[S]outhern whites believed only the carefully controlled use of force could
keep the slave at work . . ").
60. Carter, supra note 59, at 22-23.
61. Kolchin, First Freedom, supra note 57, at 35 (quoting Captain J.W. Cogswell of the
Freedman's Bureau).
62. Tenants began each season unable to finance the year's crop and had to seek
credit from their landlords or the local merchants, who required that the tenant
remain until the debt was paid ....
Hard-working tenants could be made to stay
by exaggerating their indebtedness through dishonest bookkeeping.
Jonathan M. Wiener, Class Structure and Economic Development in the American South,
1865-1955, in 3 From Slavery to Sharecropping, supra note 50, at 358, 367 [hereinafter
Wiener, Class Structure and Economic Development]; see also Rebecca J. Scott, Fault
Lines, Color Lines, and Party Lines, in Beyond Slavery, 61, 66 (Frederick Cooper et al. eds.,
2000) (noting freed slaves' contesting of Freemen's Bureau's rules).
63. Rose, supra note 49, at 357.
64. Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, supra note 18, at 19. For instance, "80 percent of the
sharecroppers in Alabama had an indebtedness of more than one year's standing."
Wiener, Class Structure and Economic Development, supra note 62, at 367.
65. See Stanley, supra note 39, at 124.
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lated, low-wage labor market" that was slavery's legacy.6 6 Racially-targeted
convict lease laws and chain gangs fueled state-run factories and the development of the railroads. 6 7 Northern interest in blacks, except as labor
for the cotton harvest, waned by the 1880s.68

Redemption legislators also criminalized blacks' refusal to labor,
69
hence ensuring a constant pool of readily-available and cheap labor.
Laws restricting the mobility of the black labor force included emigrantagent provisions, 70 contract-enforcement statutes, vagrancy statutes, convict-labor laws, 7 1 and criminal surety systems. 72 The false pretenses and
criminal surety laws challenged in the Peonage cases were critical compo73
nents of this system.
In sum, freedom was "a constantly moving target." 74 The free market established by Emancipation and the Freedman's Bureau shaped a
"free laboring class" trapped "on the plantations and under the planter
class." 75 Nevertheless, a coherent and pervasive social philosophy grew to
66. Lichtenstein, supra note 23, at 10-12; see Oshinsky, supra note 22, at 57-84
(providing a state-by-state account of the industrial uses of convict labor in turpentine
camps, coal mines, and the like). The convict lease system endured well into the 1920s, for
instance, in the Florida and Alabama coal and turpentine industries. See Lichtenstein,
supra note 23, at xv. Nonetheless, the precise relation between racism and industrial
development is still contested. Compare Montgomery, supra note 51, at 147 (noting that
Southern black labor disputes threatened to rupture relations with the Republican Party),
with Wiener, Class Structure and Economic Development, supra note 62, at 365 (arguing
that "racism slowed capitalist development in the postwar South almost to a halt").
67. See Lichtenstein, supra note 23, at 28-29 (noting that "existing felony laws were
sufficiently severe and arbitrary that blacks found themselves with long penitentiary
sentences for petty crimes, and whites seemed to avoid prison sentences altogether").
68. See Kolchin, Business Press, supra note 30, at 187 ("Concern for the cotton crop
led the United States Economist to deplore the idleness of Southern Negroes."). Nor did
Northern unions spare much thought for black laborers. See Philip S. Foner, The IWW
and the Black Worker, 55 J. of Negro Hist. 45, 48 (1970) (noting that "with the exception
of the United Mine Workers... the I.W.W. was the only labor organization in the second
decade of the twentieth century which stood squarely for the organization of Negro
workers on the basis of complete equality").
69. The criminal laws were thus not applied consistently, but rather only when labor
was particularly scarce. See William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South,
1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysis, in 12 African American Life, 1861-1900: Black
Southerners and the Law, 1865-1900, at 32-56 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994). Only when
labor was superabundant could blacks take advantage of windows of lax enforcement to
flee to the Southwest, as they did in large numbers after 1916. See id.
70. These assessed prohibitive licensing fees against those who moved labor from state
to state. See Wiener, Class Structure and Economic Development, supra note 62, at 362.
71. See Lichtenstein, supra note 23, at 1-30.
72. See Daniel, Metamorphosis of Slavery, supra note 50, at 71-72; see also Wiener,
Class Structure and Economic Development, supra note 62, at 362-63 (listing the ways
planters controlled black labor, including restrictive laws, manipulation of the Freedman's
Bureau, and Klan violence targeted at labor contract violators).
73. See Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, supra note 18, at 19-20 (describing the laws that
constituted peonage).
74. Fields, supra note 49, at 193.
75. Weiner, Social Origins, supra note 25, at 57-58.
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support the preeminence and naturalness of free market relations. This
vision of contractual liberty, which convinced many state courts and
briefly entranced the United States Supreme Court, is detailed below.
B. The Laissez-FaireMarket
Laissez-faire jurisprudence flourished at the confluence of several intellectual and historical tides: Jacksonian individualism, 76 the abolition77
ists' emphasis on contract as the solvent of antiquated status relations,
78
and the need to constrain labor unrest. Economists, such as John Bates
Clark, and lawyers, including Thomas Cooley and Christopher Tiedeman,
developed a theory of markets and law that justified the status quo by
fusing formal equality in contracting with an emphasis on the fairness of
voluntary transacting. 79 Laissez-faire's proponents contended that "the
market would automatically reward labor and capital in proportion to the
76. See Paul D. Carrington, The Constitutional Law Scholarship of Thomas McIntyre
Cooley, 41 Am. J. Legal Hist. 368, 370 (1997) (noting that Cooley's views were "clearly
derived from the Jacksonian democratic persuasion he imbibed as a youth"); Phillip S.
Paludan, Law and the Failure of Reconstruction: The Case of Thomas Cooley, 33 J. Hist.
Ideas 597, 602 (1972) (describing Cooley's debt to theJacksonian ideal that "constitutional
government was limited government, and that under just law all men's rights were equal").
77. See Foner, Meaning of Freedom, supra note 27, at 448-49 (discussing Abolitionist
allegiance to freedom of contract); Stanley, supra note 39, at 20-25 ("Legitimating wage
labor was a central part of the abolitionist project.").
78. See Jacobs, supra note 14, at 24 (" [L] iberty of contract as a limitation upon the
powers of both the state and the national governments was a judicial answer to the
demands of industrialists in the period of business expansion following the Civil War."); cf.
Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of
Commodities, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 939, 939 (1985) [hereinafter Kennedy, Role of Law]
("[M]ainstream economic thought has been a vehicle for legitimating the actual
arrangements of the capitalism of the time.").
79. Thomas Cooley's 1868 treatise was the first extremely influential treatise to be
published in the wake of the Reconstruction Amendments, even though it was initially
intended as a commentary on state, not federal, constitutions. See Jacobs, supra note 14,
at 22, 29. It "formulated the doctrines of class legislation, of implied limits on state
legislative power, and of substantive due process." Id at 27. Christopher Tiedeman's
treatise was published in 1886 and was "the most extreme defense of constitutional laissez
faire principles ever written." Id. These are the bookends of laissez-faire's induction into
the legal canon. See Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 175-263,
533-602, 735-754 (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1927) (1868); 1 Christopher G. Tiedeman,
A Treatise on the Limitations of the Police Power 1-19 (St. Louis, The F. H. Thomas Law
Book Co. 1886) [hereinafter Tiedeman, Limitations of the Police Power]; see also John
Bates Clark, The Distribution of Wealth: A Theory of Wages, Interest, and Profits 1-9
(New York, Augustus M. Kelley 1965) (1899); John Chipman Gray, Restraints on the
Alienation of Property 1-6 (Boston, Boston Book Co. 1895) (1883); 1 Christopher G.
Tiedeman, A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United
States 1-23 (1900). For a general overview of these works, see Barbara H. Fried, The
Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire: Robert Hale and the First Law and Economics
Movement 1-2, 23-26 (1998) (describing the ideas of Tiedeman and Clark, and focusing
on the marginalist theory of value).
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value each had generated." 80 Clark, one of the more sophisticated economists of the period, argued that "in a competitive market, each factor of
production... would be paid an amount exactly equal to the value of its
marginal product."81 Prices were "'natural. . . . . [I]t would violate
human nature . . . to pay more for a commodity than its labor value"

because a buyer could just produce the good for the same output of labor.8 2 "[T]he market-clearing price would equal the marginal cost to
suppliers." 83 Voluntary, private contracts would hence generate fair outcomes without state intervention since parties would never pay more than
the marginal value of a commodity. 84 Laissez-faire provided a pre-political ground for elaborating legal norms by claiming to establish a set of
"intrinsically just ground rules for economic struggle among private actors." 85 Fairness was predicated on the voluntary nature of transactions,
and equality could be guaranteed by ensuring that "no one shall receive
from the law special privileges,"8 6 and by ignoring "the fact of a society of
87

unequal individuals."

Clark's model of just market outcomes required that law facilitate
market outcomes by "respect[ing] the will of private parties concerning
property and contracts." 88 Courts accordingly derived liberty of contract
from "immutable principles of justice," established through "'settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of
England.' "89 Liberty of contract could be extrapolated in particular from
80. Fried, supra note 79, at 2.
81. Id. Of course, Clark's was not the only theory used to justify the free market.
82. Kennedy, Role of Law, supra note 78, at 944 (noting that in sophisticated markets
competition prevented prices from diverging from natural levels).
83. Fried, supra note 79, at 26.
84. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 555 (1923) (disapproving of a
minimum wage law for women because "[the price fixed by the board need have no
relation to the capacity or earning power of the employee").
85. Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness:
The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 Res. L. & Soc'y 3, 5 (1980)
[hereinafter Kennedy, Legal Consciousness]. Horwitz identifies a late nineteenth century
"tendency to generalize and systematize" which had the "goal of rendering private law
more scientific and less political." Horwitz, supra note 30, at 14-15.
86. Paludan, supra note 76, at 602. Suspicion of government led Cooley, for instance,
to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly. See id. at 614.
87. Id. at 604-05 ("Cooley would never clearly understand the contradiction between
equality and individualism."). In 1909, legal realists lodged the same complaint. Roscoe
Pound observed that courts "force upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the
face of practical conditions of inequality." Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L.J.
454, 454-58 (1909).
88. Kennedy, Role of Law, supra note 78, at 956. Duncan Kennedy uses this phrase to
describe legal economic thought in general.
89. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898) (quoting Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855)). Christopher
Tiedeman restricted the role of government to "enforcement of the legal maxim, sic utere
tuo, ut alienum non laedas." 1 Tiedeman, Limitations of the Police Power, supra note 79, at
vii; see also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (arguing that in the "privilege
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the common law's solicitude for property. 90 One supposedly natural and
immutable principle forbade "that one man's property, or right to property, shall be taken for the benefit of another."9 1 Since property was acquired and transmitted through contract, the latter was equally sacrosanct. 92 In addition, constitutional tradition demanded protection of
settled property rights againstjealous majorities. 93 Through a promise of
formal equality before the law, put into effect via a prohibition on "class
legislation," 9 4 and a guarantee of voluntariness in transactions, the Court

of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade and of acquiring, holding, and selling property
must be embraced the right to make all proper contracts in relation thereto").
90. The recognition of property as a foundational liberty can be traced back to the
English common law, and the "customs of freeholders, sanctioned and enforced by the
King's justices" out of which "the institutions of property and liberty were fashioned." John
R. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism 49 (1924).
91. Holden, 169 U.S. at 390.
92. 2 Cooley, supra note 79, at 801 ("Freedom in the making of contracts of personal
employment [was] . . . an elementary part of the rights of personal liberty and private
property."); see also Commons, supra note 90, at 22 ("Property means anything than can
be bought and sold, and since one's liberty can be bought and sold, liberty is assets, and
therefore liberty is property."); Jacobs, supra note 14, at 37 ("[L]iberty and property are
related by means of the economic hypothesis that labor as the source of property is
property."); Paul Kens, Justice Stephen Field: Shaping Liberty from the Gold Rush to the
Gilded Age 5 (1997) ("Under laissez-faire theory, property and free exchange were natural
rights."); Louise A. Halper, Christopher G. Tiedeman, 'Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism'
and the Dilemmas of Small-Scale Property in the Gilded Age, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 1349,
1359-61 (1990) (discussing the possible textual sources for this limitation upon
governmental power).
93. James Madison argued that "a pure democracy" would be "incompatible with
personal security or the rights of property" because of the danger that "a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens." The Federalist
No. 10, at 81, 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Indeed, "through the
republic's first century and a half, property . .. was the paradigm of the constitutionally
protected private sphere." Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the
Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319, 1327-28 (1987) (arguing also that
.property seems to have been, above all others, the realm of affairs in which it was feared
that factional interest would overcome civic empathy and enlightened deliberation,
propelling government toward exploitative and unjust action"); see also Horwitz, supra
note 30, at 9 (noting that the "paramount dangers of redistribution of wealth and of
levelling" were recognized early in American constitutional thought); Gordon S. Wood,
The Radicalism of the American Revolution 268-70 (1992) (noting an early concern for
the representation of property interests in legislatures). This tradition derives from
eighteenth-century England, where "[t]he British state... existed to preserve the property
and, incidentally, the lives and liberties, of the propertied." E.P. Thompson, Whigs and
Hunters 21 (Penguin Books 1990) (1977).
94. 1-2 Cooley, supra note 79, at 393, 740 (noting that legislation that favors one class
was "purely arbitrary or capricious" and "a wrongful and highly injurious invasion of
property rights"). Throughout the Lochner era, a concern for class legislation can be seen.
See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (invalidating federal legislation that
forbade employers from requiring employees not to join unions); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 63-64 (1905) (arguing for close judicial scrutiny of legislative motives in light
of potential resource transfers, and opposing any redistributive regulation).
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established "proper limits on government." 95 The "law of the land (or
due process of law)" thus became "a substantive limitation upon legisla96
tive powers."
With powerful roots in constitutional tradition, the common law,
and the imprimatur of leading social scientists, liberty of contract pierced
Supreme Court jurisprudence through a dissent in the Slaughter-House
Cases.97 In contrast to the majority's vision of the Fourteenth Amendment as fundamentally conservative of antebellum federalism, dissenting
Justices Field and Bradley presented a vision of liberty of contract as a
near-immutable right protected by federal law.98 The dissenters posited a
"right to pursue the ordinary avocations of life without other restraint
than such as affects all others," 99 and argued that this right limited the
state's ability to regulate under the "police power."100 A liberty of contract limit on the police power proved congruent with previous understandings of the police power's margins. 10 1 Legislative power to regulate
was somewhat analogous to the power to resolve private disputes by adjudicating private rights. 10 2 The Slaughter-Housedissenters' view of the market was rapidly adopted by several state courts, which "distinguish [ed]
between exercises of the police power and exercises of arbitrary power"
favoring one class. 103 While at first the Supreme Court "failed to keep
95. Sian E. Provost, Note, A Defense of a Rights-Based Approach to Identifying
Coercion in Contract Law, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 629, 629 (1995).
96. Jacobs, supra note 14, at 32.

97. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
98. The natural-law vision of property rights was heavily buttressed by abolitionist
ideas.

See Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-

Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J.
Am. Hist. 970, 973-74 (1975) (describing Justice Field's allegiances to antislavery ideas);
William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 527-32, 551-56 (1974)
(describing the way in which Justices Field and Bradley put antislavery notions of natural
rights into practice).
99. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 90 (Field, J., dissenting); see also Dent v. West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114, 121 (1889) (Field,J.) ("[I]t is undoubtedly the right of every citizen.., to follow
any lawful calling, business, or profession."); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129,
139 (1873) (Field, J., concurring) (affirming the right to a lawful calling).
100. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 87 (Field, J., dissenting); see
also Horwitz, supra note 30, at 29-31 (describing the increasing judicial scrutiny of police
power regulation).
101. Nuisance was the "standard legal category for talking about the state's regulatory
power over the health, safety and morals of its citizens." Horwitz, supra note 30, at 27. The
state could regulate when the regulated activity was within the "class of per se
nuisance[s] ...derived from customary... norms." Id. at 28. If the state could intervene
to prevent a nuisance, the theory went, it also had power to intervene by statute. What had
traditionally been denominated a nuisance could be regulated.
102. See Kennedy, Legal Consciousness, supra note 85, at 14-19 (describing this
translation of legal concepts from one field to another).
103. Jacobs, supra note 14, at 36; see id. at 39-97 (describing the spread of freedom
of contract doctrine). For instances of state court applications of liberty of contract, see In
re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 115 (1885) (invalidating labor laws for tenant-sweatshop workers);
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pace with the state judiciaries," and later fell short of laissez-faire's extreme applications, it nonetheless integrated notions of formal equality
and voluntariness into Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
10 4
jurisprudence.
C. The Problem of Coercion
The contrast between the labor markets of Progressive Era America
and the formal elegance of laissez-faire jurisprudence provoked an intractable problem: Such jurisprudence invited challenges that wage labor
had been coerced. Indeed, such accusations flooded into legislatures,
precipitating maximum hour and minimum wage legislation, threatening
to disrupt the status quo distribution of surpluses. Mindful that
"[b]argains are made only when both parties consent to them"' 0 5-so coercion invalidated a contract-the Court needed a limiting principle for
coercion claims that could choke redistributive legislation and maintain
0 6
laissez-faire's ideological coherence.1
Coercion is difficult to account for systematically. At least three elementary definitions of coercion-based on efficiency, subjective experience, and normative commitments-provide recognizable, but unstable,
definitions. A brief survey reveals problems with all three approaches.
First, a court concerned with efficiency might contend that when "the
amount buyers gain from more favorable obligations, measured by the
maximum buyers would be willing to pay for those obligations, [is greater
than] the amount sellers would lose," a contract is voluntary. 10 7 However, this test for coercion is underinclusive' 0 8 and difficult to execute in
Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. 1886) (holding unconstitutional the use of
company scrip); State v. Goodwill 10 S.E. 285, 288 (W. Va. 1889) (striking down a West
Virginia statute that made the use of company stores illegal).
104. Jacobs, supra note 14, at 85-97 (charting applications of freedom of contract in
the Supreme Court). The Court first acknowledged the validity of freedom of contract
ideas in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
105. Robert L. Hale, Freedom through Law 9 (1952) [hereinafter Hale, Freedom
through Law] (emphasis added).
106. Cf. Horwitz, supra note 30, at 33 ("[E]very interference with the contract
system-such as the regulation of the terms and conditions of a labor contract-was
treated as an attack on the very idea of the market as a natural and neutral institution for
distributing rewards.").
107. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and
Related Doctrines, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1993). This is simply the assumption of mutual
gain articulated in some detail.
108. For instance, where "Y is drowning (through no one's fault), and X refuses to
rescue him unless he agrees to have his leg amputated." Id. at 34. David Hume reached
the same conclusion:
Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his
country when he knows no foreign language or manners and lives from day to day
by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert that a man, by
remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master, though he
was carried on board while asleep and must leap into the ocean and perish the
moment he leaves her.
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practice. 10 9 Second, courts could look to the victim's subjective feeling of
being constrained to ascertain the presence of coercion. 110 This definition of coercion thus fluctuates between victims. Since endorsement of a
subjective understanding of coercion would precipitate "a failure to make
rules understandable [and] such frequent change in the rules that the
subject cannot orient his action by them," it must be rejected for rule of
law reasons. 1 ' Finally, a normative account of coercion might establish a
baseline to distinguish benefits and harms, independent of plaintiffs' subjective perceptions. While there are several contenders for this baseline,
through a clear precommitment, courts could establish a predictable
rule. '1 2 In practice however, a stable baseline is difficult to formulate, as
David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in David Hume's Political Essays 43, 51 (Charles W.
Hendel ed., 1953); see also Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 101 (3d ed. 1986)
(suggesting that a highwayman's offer of "your money or your life" could be described as
prompting a free choice by the victim).
109. See Craswell, supra note 107, at 21-24 (discussing the complexity and difficulty
of such an inquiry by a court); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal
Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 603 (1982) (noting that many efficiency arguments
rest "on empirical data that no one seems to have ready at hand").
The efficiency model has another difficulty. All transactions can be described as
pervasively coercive. In the putatively voluntary transaction, "each [party] yields in order
to avoid the disadvantage to which the other can subject him. That is, he yields to a
threat." Hale, Freedom through Law, supra note 105, at 9. Even if A is willing to part with
her money for B's goods, only the threat of B's withholding forces A to part with her
dollars. If any trade is tainted by coercion, the policy decision to define one transaction as
"coercive" and another as "voluntary" cannot rest on the mere presence of coercion. Contra
Richard A. Epstein, The Assault that Failed: The Progressive Critique of Laissez Faire, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 1697, 1703-04 (1999) (arguing that coercion still has a normative meaning
when defined in efficiency terms).
110. Peter Westen points out that the common working notion of coercion is more
complex than this, involving "'an interpersonal relation requiring a complex intention by
the agent."' Peter Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"-Virtue Words and Vice Words,
1985 Duke L.J. 541, 569 (quoting Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in Nomos XIV: Coercion
19 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1972)). According to Westen, the agent must have
knowledge of and intend the coercive effect, and the coerced action must be one the
victim was unlikely to do anyway. See id.
111. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 39 (rev. ed. 1975). For evidence that, even in
the context of middle class, suburban culture, widely variant understandings of coercion
are possible, see Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 458-64 (2d Cir. 1996)
(finding that a mandatory school community service program had no constitutional
defect); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 1443, 1447-55
(M.D.N.C. 1995) (refusing to find that a school community service program violated the
Thirteenth Amendment); Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 789 F. Supp. 1337, 1341-47
(E.D. Pa. 1992) (granting summary judgment to a school in a Thirteenth Amendment
challenge to its community service requirement). Kansas lawyers resenting the burden of
mandatory representation of indigent clients presented another extreme claim of
coercion. See Sharp v. State, 783 P.2d 343, 346-48 (Kan. 1989) (rejecting this claim).
112. See, e.g.,Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 Va. L. Rev.
79, 81 (1981) ("When a person A consents to a proposal from B, and when his only or
paramount reason for consenting to the proposal is his suffering wrongful treatment from
B, then in such a case A has no moral obligation (even prima facie) generated from the act
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Court's unconstitutional conditions jurisequivocation in the Supreme
11 3
prudence demonstrates.
Thus, traditional understandings of coercion prove difficult to formulate as adjudicative rules. The Supreme Court chose a different way to
define coercion. By taking judicial notice of its own preconceived notion
of what plaintiffs could be coerced, the Court constructed its own, rather
solipsistic, categorization of cognizable coercion claims1 14 whereby only
those classes it understood to be naturally weak and incapable received
protection. In other words, the Court established its own normative baseline premised upon its own subjective notions of "the standard of a responsible, freely choosing employee."' 15 Those notions derived from cultural
of consent."); Robert Nozick, Coercion, in Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in
Honor of Ernest Nagel 440, 463 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (arguing that
coercion depends on whether the new set of alternatives presented by the putatively
coercive act would have been preferred ex ante to the offer); Westen, supra note 110, at
589 ("A coercive constraint is anything that leaves a person worse off either than he
otherwise expects to be or than he ought to be for refusing to do the proponent's
bidding.").
113. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1415,
1436 (1989) ("The notion of a 'penalty' . . . poses problems; the characterization of a
condition as a 'penalty' or as a 'nonsubsidy' depends on the baseline from which one
measures."). Distinguishing harms from helpful acts is complicated by the law's tendency
to describe inaction that is to be discouraged as an act. When the law stigmatizes behavior,
often "language is used which makes my wrong conduct seem to consist of wrongful acts
instead of wrongful failure to act." Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 475 (1923) [hereinafter Hale,
Coercion and Distribution].
Most baselines prove impracticable. First, a rule that found coercion only where an
immoral action is threatened fails: Disagreements on morality would lead afresh to rule of
law problems. See Murphy, supra note 112, at 81-82. Nor would a baseline that
distinguished criminal from legitimate acts work. Many laws treat "a threat to do what one
has a right to do... as coercive." Sullivan, supra, at 1443-44 (emphasis added). This would
include a blackmailer's threat of revealing information, an employer's threat of interfering
with or restraining a worker's exercise of rights, or even a contracting party's "'improper
threat . . .that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative.'" Id. (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 175(I) (1981)). Hence, the Court would have to distinguish
between (a) acts one has a right to do which are coercive and (b) acts one has a right to do
which are not coercive, without a principled way to distinguish between the two.
Finally, asking whether the act proffered is a benefit or a burden to the victim also
produces rule of law problems. "Benefit" and "burden" are "relative terms [that] refer to a
change in an agent's condition." Westen, supra note 110, at 572.
114. The Legal Realists have noted the importance of classification. See Karl N.
Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1934) (noting that
the "classification of the facts may be so clear that rules can 'decide' cases even out of
court").
115. Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 753, 763
(1994). This is not to argue that the Court was unaware of other means of analyzing
coercion. In Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R. Comm'n, Justice Sutherland noted that
coercion could result where a person "is given no choice, except a choice between the rock
and the whirlpool,-an option to forego a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood or
submit to a requirement which may constitute an intolerable burden." 271 U.S. 583, 593
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stereotypes. Once the Court ceased viewing a particular category as weak,
protective regulation could no longer be justified.1 16 This model for coercion had advantages for a court attempting to limit the redistributive
impact of legislation, since it meant that only already-marginalized
groups with little political muscle, such as women and African-Americans,
merited protective legislation. Most of the redistributive legislation that
would be demanded by populist legislators could thus be rejected.
The next Part explores the reasoning used by the Court in several
Lochner-era cases and argues that when a regulation's validity depended
on a judgment about coercion (and not health or safety), the Court engaged in an imaginative construction of persons it believed could be coerced. The final Part looks at the spillover of this idea into the definition
of "involuntary servitude" in the Peonage cases.

II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S UNDERSTANDING OF COERCION IN SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS CASES (1905-1923)

In this Part, cases from Lochner onward are examined for evidence of
this model of coercion. Legislation was vindicated in many substantive
due process challenges because the Court found valid health and safety
reasons or through extensions of nuisance doctrine.1 17 The following account of coercion does not apply to such cases. Furthermore, the theory
was not held by all members of the Court; 118 nor was it the only theory
expressed in majority opinions during the period in question. 119 Rather,
(1926). This coercion analysis rejects the facile privilege/burden distinction, noting that
even when a litigant does not necessarily have an immutable right to some good,
deprivation of this good can be devastating. Hence, the Court was quite capable of
engaging in sophisticated debates about an appropriate normative baseline for a coercion
analysis, but chose not to do so.
116. As a consequence, the Court was solicitous of women in Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908), but not in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). See infra
notes 143-147 and accompanying text.
117. Since health reasons posed less danger of majoritarian redistributive motives and
were therefore more central to the police power, the law would have been much easier to
justify as a health measure. See G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and
Holmes's Lochner Dissent, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 87, 100 (1997) ("The question of whether the
statute in Lochner was a 'public health' or a 'labor' measure was thus seen as central to the
decision of its constitutionality.").
118. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 41 (1915) (Day, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
proprietors lay down the rules and the laborers are practically constrained to obey them.
In such cases self-interest is often an unsafe guide .... (citation omitted)); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 191 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The section simply
prohibits the more powerful party to exact certain undertakings, or to threaten dismissal
or unjustly discriminate on certain grounds against those already employed.").
119. See, e.g., Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 12, 20 (1901) ("The legislature
evidently deemed the laborer at some disadvantage .... [The law's] tendency, though
slight it may be, is to place the employer and employt- upon equal ground in the matter of
wages .....
); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898) ("[T]he fact that both parties are
of full age and competent to contract does not necessarily deprive the State of the power to
interfere where the parties do not stand upon an equality."); Jacobs, supra note 14, at
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it was one of various strands ofjurisprudence contesting for supremacy in
the Lochner era.
A. Defining the Wards of the State: Lochner, Adair, and Coppage
In Lochner v. New York, the Court envisaged a market in which coercion was defined in terms of categories the Court understood as inherently weak and incapable.1 20 Lochner invalidated a New York statute providing that no employee would work in a biscuit, bread, or cake bakery
establishment more than sixty hours in any one week, or more than ten
hours in any one day, because the law burdened the "general right to
make a contract [which is] part of the liberty of the individual protected
12 1
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution."
An initial criterion Justice Peckham, writing for the Court, identified
for regulation was the possibility of weakness and incapacity on the part
of the protected class. Regulation would be permitted when those protected were "not equal in intelligence and capacity to men in other
trades . . . [o]r . . . able to assert their rights and care for themselves . . . "122 Only "wards of the State" merited a solicitude that could
be manifested as regulation. 123 Hence, only the personal incapacity of a
contracting party, a lack of intelligence or inability to function within the
market, undermined "the right to purchase and sell labor upon such
terms as the parties may agree" and could as a result justify state coercion.' 24 In Lochner, Peckham felt no need even to inquire into the status
of the bakers as fully capable contracting parties; their capacity was obvious. The task ofjudging consisted, for Peckham, not in the examination
of disputable facts, but in "the objective task of drawing lines" by classify25
ing bakers as a non-coercible class.'
Next, Peckham considered possible health and safety rationales,
since the law in question had to "be upheld, if at all, as a law pertaining to
1 26
the health of the individual engaged in the occupation of a baker."
85-96 (describing the Supreme Court's vacillating allegiance to laissez-faire doctrine);
Alexander, supra note 10, at 105 (arguing that the "Supreme Court never consistently
applied liberty of contract"). In other cases, another, stronger principle foreclosed the
option of protecting the vulnerable class. For instance, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court
invalidated the Federal Child Labor Act of 1916 on federalism grounds. See 247 U.S. 251,

273 (1918).
120. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

121. Id. at 53.
122. Id. at 57.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 64. Justice Peckham pays particular attention to the analysis of coercion in

Lochner because of his belief that the health reason otherwise proposed by the state was
clearly specious.

125. Kennedy, Legal Consciousness, supra note 85, at 12.
126. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57; see also Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 555-56
(1923) (rejecting the argument that a minimum wage law for women would protect morals
on the grounds that "[i]t cannot be shown that well paid women safeguard their morals
more carefully than those who are poorly paid"); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 434-36
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Rather than reviewing the validity of evidence proffered for the health
justification or reaching, as Justice Harlan did, to the authority of textbooks and social science reports, Justice Peckham took judicial notice of
the Court's "common knowledge."1 2 7 In assessing the risks of the bakery
trade, he noted that "[t]o the common understanding the trade of a
baker has never been regarded as an unhealthy one. ' 128 Justice Peckham
asked whether in his understanding of bakers solicitude was warranted,
hence measuring and evaluating legislative judgment against the Court's,
not the legislature's, common knowledge. 129 Both of Peckham's lines of
reasoning thus rested on a comparison between the New York statute and
the Court's own understanding of the world.
In Adair v. United States, coercive regulation could not be justified
because a class conceived by the Justices to be weak was unavailable. 130 In
his opinion for the majority in Adair, Justice Harlan abandoned his
nuanced, contextual Lochner approach13 1 and rejected federal legislation
banning yellow-dog contract clauses (which forbade employees from joining unions), in disregard of labor's well-known bargaining weakness. The
opinion is remarkable for its positive disavowal of factual inquiry: "We
will not indulge in any such [factual] conjectures, nor make them, in
whole or in part, the basis of our decision." 13 2 Instead of assessing facts,

(1917) (distinguishing real health laws from pretextual redistributive legislation); cf.
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 396 (1898) (finding a maximum hours law for miners valid
as a health measure).
127. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58. Commentators have noted the use of "common
knowledge" by the Court in other cases of the period. In particular, in the racial
prerequisite cases, the Court "naturalized Whiteness by locating the definitions of racial
difference in common knowledge." Ian F. Haney L6pez, White by Law: The Legal
Construction of Race 163 (1996).
128. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59; cf. Horwitz, supra note 30, at 30 (noting that the Court
had to determine "whether the particular occupation in question was 'in and of itself'
unhealthy").
129. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59-60 ("But are we all ... at the mercy of legislative
majorities?"). The Court then launches into a parade of horribles that would result if the
bakers' claim was granted. One way of looking at this argument is as a rule of law concern
relating to the subjective nature of coercion. If anyone's version of coercion were valid,
Justice Peckham argued, and subjective definitions of coercion were acted upon by the
legislature, then there would be no predicting what sort of laws would be passed; indeed,
the legislative power would become, in effect, wholly arbitrary. Justice Holmes responded
to this rule of law problem: Where the majority acts, Holmes implied, there is no problem
with the rule of law, since logically, the legislative will is that of the majority, so the majority
will know what type of laws to expect. See id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting the
right of a majority to embody its opinions in law).
130. 208 U.S. 161, 179 (1908).
131. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 70-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing social science
evidence for regulating bakers).
132. Adair, 208 U.S. at 179. Contra id. at 191 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the statute "simply prohibits the more powerful party to exact certain undertakings, or to
threaten dismissal or unjustly discriminate on certain grounds").
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Harlan searched for a "legal or logical" basis forjudgment1 3 3 Such legal
and logical categories grew from the stock of judicial common sense,
which told the Court that railway workers were not predisposed to coercion. Rather, they were a dangerous class with potentially redistributive
aspirations. 134 By refusing to move beyond the Court's preconceived categories, Justice Harlan confidently grounded his decision on a formal
"equality of right" that, in practice, was a nullity. 135
Similarly, in Coppage v. Kansas, a challenge to a state law that penalized anti-union contractual clauses, Justice Pitney could establish, upon "a
little reflection," the "self-evident" impossibility of remedying distributional inequality. 136 Reflection turned not on the context of the law but
on Pitney's intuitive categorization of the world. Tellingly, the Kansas
Supreme Court similarly adverted to "common knowledge" in upholding
the law before the Supreme Court took the case.' 3 7 By appealing to "the
nature of things," Justice Pitney suggested that laborers' coercion by employers was not a cognizable form of coercion, and so could not be reme138
died by the state.
However, one labor regulation case, Holden v. Hardy, deviates from
this pattern. 139 Holden involved health and safety regulations for miners,
which the Court principally vindicated as extensions of the state's power
to regulate unusual activities under nuisance doctrines. 140 Justice Brown
nonetheless noted that the relation of miners to owners was one tinged
by coercion, since "laborers are practically constrained to obey" owners. 141 Acknowledging the coercion claim even so obliquely in Holden
may have been possible because the Court knew that the law applied only
to a small group of workers 14 2 and hence could not be the basis of broad
redistribution.
133. Id. at 178 (arguing that a "legal or logical connection" with interstate commerce
is absent). Justice Harlan here analyzed the viability of the statute under the Commerce
Clause power: He could not find the requisite "connection" because he cannot see the
railroad worker in Adair as oppressed, and hence could not see the need for federal
intervention.
134. See id. at 179 (refusing to impute to Congress "the purpose to accord to one
class of wage-earners privileges withheld from another class of wage-earners").
135. Id. at 175 ("[Tlhe employer and the employ6 have equality of right, and any
legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of
contract....").
136. 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1914).
137. Id.
138. Id. Justice Pitney's argument that inequality is pervasive fails to respond to the
notion that at some point, inequality is so great that it is coercive, an argument made by
Justice Day: "[L]aborers are practically constrained [and] self-interest is often an unsafe
guide." Id. at 41 (Day, J., dissenting).
139. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
140. The Court noted that the legislature's power encompassed the abatement of
nuisances, which were a more frequent occurrence, since the people in the several States
pursued trades that were no longer "purely... agricultural." Id. at 392-93.
141. Id. at 397.
142. See id. at 396-97.
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In sum, the Court's willingness to accept a class's claim of coercion
generally depended on its preconceived categories of weakness. Where
the latter was unavailable (as for bakers and railway workers), the Court
proved unwilling to analyze factual contexts. Instead, the common sense
of the Justices served as the basis for rejecting claims in each instance.
B. Women as a 'Coercible' Class: Muller, Bradwell, and Adkins
The judicial construction of the 'coercible' subject also helps explain
shifting judicial attitudes toward women in Muller v. Oregon,14 3 Bradwell v.
Illinois,14 4 and Adkins v. Children's Hospital.145 In Muller, the Court upheld
an Oregon statute that forbade the employment of women for more than
ten hours in any one day, 146 despite having rejected such a minimum
wage law in Lochner three years earlier. 14 7 Women's potential to be coerced was not factually weighed, but asserted on the basis of universal
truths. Justice Brewer's opinion is not so much an analysis of the disadvantages facing women in economic life as a disquisition into an essential
nature of women, understood as inherently incapable of protecting
themselves. The "fact" of female inferiority could be deduced through
'judicial cognizance" of "general knowledge."' 48 Women's competitive
disadvantage in life was "obvious," female dependency revealed by mere
"history."1 49 Female incapacity followed from an inherent "disposition
and habits of life which will operate against a full assertion of . . .
rights."' 5 0 Thus, common knowledge modulated sub silentio into established fact in the course of the opinion.
The majority's reliance on self-evident propositions suggests a mistrust of factual evidence. Indeed, the Court expressed skepticism about
the value of legislative and social fact to constitutional interpretation.
Legislation was only evidence of "widespread belieft-hence hardly
"authorit[ative]."l51 Legislative will required verification against the selfevident and timeless truths embodied by the Court's categorization of the
world. Justice Brewer, rather than drawing from Louis Brandeis's fact143. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
144. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).

145. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
146. 208 U.S. at 423; cf. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 438-39 (1917) (upholding

on health grounds a statute that established a maximum ten-hour day for factory workers
of both sexes).
147. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (rejecting a similar restriction
on the number of hours male bakers could work).
148. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
149. Id. at 421. Justice Brewer, rather effusively, asserted that courts have long shared
in this acceptance of women's special status, and have accordingly treated them with
"especial care." Id. at 421. For a less sanguine view of the judicial treatment of women at
approximately the same time, see Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2121-41 (1996) (examining the regulation of
domestic violence in the nineteenth century).
150. Muller, 208 U.S. at 422.
151. Id. at 420.
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heavy brief, 152 contrasted the "unchanging" Constitution with "debated
and debatable" facts. 153 According to Professor Fiss, he used this "dis154
tancing technique" to establish the Court's mistrust of mere facts:
Brewer's basic cognitive tools thus derived from his preconceived categorization of the world, not the facts available to the Court. 15 5 The Court
applied the same presumptions in Bradwell v. Illinois, endorsing a prohibition on women's entry to the bar. 156 EvenJustices Field and Bradley, who
had stoutly protested barriers to entry to other professions, acquiesced on
the basis of "the constitution of the family organization" as provided by
"the law of the Creator."1 57 From such common knowledge they could
deduce that "It]he paramount destiny and mission of woman [are] to
158
fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother."
In Adkins, on the other hand, the Court invalidated on substantive
due process grounds a minimum wage law for women because "differences [between the sexes] have now come almost, if not quite, to the
vanishing point."15 9 Justice Sutherland reached once more to "common
thought and usage" to assess women's status. 160 As in Muller and Bradwell,
the crucial metric for whether a class could be subject to special protec152. See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 215 (noting that Brandeis's 113-page brief had
111 pages of facts and two of law).
153. Muller, 208 U.S. at 420.
154. Justice Brewer "did not treat the brief as demonstrating a factual connection
between health and the number of hours worked, but only as evidence 'of a widespread
belief . . . .'" Owen M. Fiss, History of the Supreme Court, Volume VII: Troubled
Beginnings of the Modem State, 1888-1910, at 176 (1993) (quoting Muller, 208 U.S. at
419-20). Justice Brewer further warned in the opinion against relying upon facts, as
opposed to established constitutional and judicial doctrine. See 208 U.S. at 420
("Constitutional questions, it is true, are not settled by even a consensus of present public
opinion, for .. . a written constitution ... places in unchanging form limitations upon
legislative action."). As opposed to Holmes, who deferred to majority will and its factfinding capacity, Brewer concluded that the Court was better equipped to identify truth, at
least in constitutional terms. Contra Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923)
(citing as empirical evidence "the present day trend of legislation").
155. Indeed, "ignorance of the actual situations of fact... and the supposed lack of
legal warrant for knowing them" proved sufficient for the law's invalidation. Pound, supra
note 87, at 470.
156. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872) (holding that admission to the bar was not
among the federal privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
157. Id. at 141 (further noting the "natural and proper timidity and delicacy" of
women) (Bradley, J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553.
160. Id. Dissenting, Chief Justice Taft fixed upon this shift in the nature of general
knowledge: "I don't think we are warranted in varying constitutional construction based
on physical differences between men and women, because of the [Nineteenth]
Amendment." Id. at 567 (Taft, C.J., dissenting). This explanation is still available at the
vanishing cusp of the Lochner era for dissenting Justice Sutherland in West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 411-12 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting): "Women today stand
upon a legal and political equality with men. There is no longer any reason why they
should be put in different classes in respect of their legal right to make contracts."
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tion was the Court's general knowledge. Between Bradwell and Adkins,
the Justices' understanding of the categorization of women transformed,
migrating across the line that bounded those classes that could be coerced. Beyond the scope of this Note's inquiry is the question of whether
this shift was caused by fundamental cultural changes or a peculiarity lo161
cal to the law.

Adkins, Bradwell, and Muller hence support the thesis that the Court's
perception of a protected group's inferiority could on occasion, but not
invariably, justify regulatory deviations from the freedom of contract
norm. 162 The Court applied 'common knowledge' to distinguish classes
that could be coerced from those that could not. This test allowed the
Court to construct its own understanding of victims' subjective experience of coercion and to deny contrary factual evidence. Characterizing
the Court's behavior as "paternalistic," 163 however, obscures the Justices'
conscious and principled neutrality that strove to rise above contestable
facts to universal truths. These cases, despite their ultimately questionable results, evince a genuine desire for neutral, apolitical, and shared terrain upon which to ground decisions.
III.

DEFINING COERCION IN THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

A. The Peonage Cases and the Judicial Categorizationof Blacks
This Part considers the Peonage cases. In the prevailing academic
view, the Peonage cases "advanced the rights of blacks and gave realistic
scope to the Thirteenth Amendment's protection against involuntary servitude. 1 64 In contrast, this Part argues that these cases are best understood as extensions of the Lochner Court's approach to coercion, which
161. Some commentators have argued that this shift in attitudes towards women may
have been provoked partially by the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment: "[T]he
Adkins case presented a view of women's history that credited the suffrage amendment
[the Nineteenth Amendment] as a virtual declaration of women's equality-at least in
most spheres." Jennifer K Brown, Note, The Nineteenth Amendment and Women's
Equality, 102 Yale LJ. 2175, 2192 (1993). Certainly, feminists in the 1910s and 1920s
focused on the "economic aspects of women's political subordination." Nancy F. Cott, The
Grounding of Modern Feminism 117-29 (1987) (describing the differing attitudes of
feminist groups in the 1910s to labor legislation and the proposed equal rights
amendment).
162. These cases do not, however, prove that the Court's recognition of vulnerability
necessitated the conclusion that the Court would provide assistance, only that the Court
could chose to furnish assistance to the vulnerable.
163. Soifer, supra note 15, at 277, (arguing that the "Court enthusiastically thrust
itself into the role of the ultimate paternalist").
164. Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 21, at 820. Compare Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.,
Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The
Peonage Cases, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 646, 648 (1982) (arguing that the Peonage cases stand for
"undoubted progress in their impact on civil rights"), with Randall Kennedy, Race
Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 1622, 1647 (1986) [hereinafter Kennedy, Race Relations Law] (countering
that the Peonage cases had little impact on minorities).
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established narrow categories of people understood to be weak, incapable, and hence meriting state protection. Assumptions of black incapacity constituted the foundation of the legal attack on peonage. Thus, the
victory against peonage, such as it was, reinforced deep presumptions of
black workers' incapacity. Further, the Peonage cases impeded other
claims of coercion, by limiting their availability to those willing to selfidentify as black. Since such identification risked a loss of social capitalwhat might be called the "wages of whiteness"-the legal construction of
a gendered and race-conscious coercion constituted a barrier to similar
legal claims by those elements of the working class with sufficient political
power to challenge the distribution of rents from industrial
165
development.
1. The Context of Racial Attitudes During the Peonage Cases. - The Pe166
onage cases occurred in the context of virulent and pervasive racism.
Stereotypes of blacks' incapacity abounded, constituting part of an ideology that justified oppressive labor laws including vagrancy and criminal
surety laws.1 6 7 While blacks were crucial to the South's economic development, they never penetrated sectors of the Southern economy, such as
textile factories, where owners believed that white labor was required. 168
Professor Schmidt argues that Bailey and Reynolds are best understood as emanations
of a Progressive concern for "economic individualism and freedom of choice," and a
liberty of contract doctrine that saw barriers to leaving employment as substantive due
process violations. Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 21, at 832-33 ("A laborer's freedom of
contract... necessarily included two precious, though necessarily limited, freedoms: the
freedom to change jobs or move on in search of a better one, and the freedom to respond
to abusive or unreasonable demands by walking off the job.").
165. "Chattel slavery provided white workers with a touchstone against which to weigh
their fears and a yardstick to measure their reassurance." David R. Roediger, The Wages of
Whiteness 66 (1991) (quoting W.E.B. DuBois) [hereinafter Roediger, The Wages of
Whiteness]. In other works, Roediger has shown how white working class identity has been
fabricated "in partly racial terms." David R. Roediger, Towards the Abolition of Whiteness:
Essays on Race, Politics, and Working Class History 25 (1994).
166. Blacks had long been viewed as "a race of... laborers." C. Vann Woodward, The
Strange Career ofJim Crow 80 (1957). Northern white workers evoked the image of black
slavery to protest wage labor: In 1830s New York, they evoked images of slavery to express
disgust at restrictions upon their freedom to unionize, inventing terms such as "white
nigger" and "work like a nigger" to protest the new industrialization and its suppression of
artisans' freedoms. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness, supra note 165, at 68.
167. "The conventional wisdom regarding black labor insisted that without
supervision the black farmer would be certain to fail as an independent farmer." Sutch &
Ransom, supra note 55, at 329. Not that such views were ever universal. A meager handful
of officials in the Freedman's Bureau did think the freedmen capable of meaningful and
independent work. See, e.g., Letter from C. W. Buckley to General C. Schurz (Aug. 19,
1865), Observations on the Labor of Freedmen, in Black Workers: A Documentary History
from Colonial Times to the Present, 135, 135 (Philip S. Foner & Ronald L. Lewis, eds.,
1989) ("I have the greatest confidence that the freedman will become reliable & efficient
laborers in every branch of industry.").
168. See Lichtenstein, supra note 23, at 39 ("Textile operators' reluctance to hire
black convicts stemmed from the racist belief that African-Americans were inherently
unsuited to indoor factory labor .... ").
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"The putative inborn capacity of the one or another 'races' was commonly invoked to explain everything [from labor conditions to political
participation] ."169 Restrictive Southern labor laws that fostered peonage
were premised upon this assumption, and through regular application,
ensured the foundering of black economic hopes. 170 The Court most
likely knew of the Jim Crow system of forced labor, and its pernicious
impact, particularly upon blacks: "The Progressive era [press] delighted
171
in throwing the light of publicity on hidden horrors in American life."
The Justice Department's report on peonage also identified the invidious
racial impact of seemingly neutral laws such as the criminal surety and
false pretenses statutes. 172 Indeed, the Attorney General's amicus brief,
which accompanied Bailey's first attempt at the Supreme Court, recounted sufficient detail to convince Justice Harlan of the need to accept
the case. 173 Hence, the Court was almost certainly aware of the racial
content and the pervasiveness of the peonage laws.
In interpreting other parts of the Reconstruction Amendments, the
Court refused to remedy racial subjugation. 174 Plessy v. Ferguson, for instance, found no remedy in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause when "one race [is] inferior to another socially."1 75 Indeed,
the Plessy Court placed responsibility for the psychological effects of segregation upon blacks. 176 In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court refused to
find in the Thirteenth Amendment protection from private discrimina169. Foner, Story of Freedom, supra note 36, at 131.
170. Weiner, Class Structure and Economic Development, supra note 62, at 370
(noting that studies reflect "fairly extensive reliance on the law to repress labor").
171. Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 21, at 832. Justice Harlan's awareness of peonage's
reality is demonstrated in his dissent in Clyatt v. United States, wherein he noted how the
case "disclos[ed] barbarities of the worst kind against these negros [sic]." 197 U.S. 207,
223 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
172. See Charles W. Russell, Report on Peonage 30-31 (1908) (describing the use of
vagrancy laws in rounding up labor (mostly of blacks) during labor shortage in the South).
Federal enforcement of the peonage laws in the South was relatively weak, principally
because Southern juries tended to acquit defendants who were seen as justified in
inflicting coercion. See Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 21, at 823 (noting also that
"complacency about racial injustice and preoccupation with matters thought to be more
pressing" also hindered enforcement).
173. Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452, 456 (1908) (Harlan J., dissenting). The Court,
writing under Justice Holmes, dismissed the complaint in 1908 as premature since Bailey
had yet to be brought to trial. See id. at 453-55.
174. Cases involving the racial composition of the national body politic generally
brought forth a less attractive side of the Court. See, e.g., United States v. Thind, 261 U.S.
204, 213 (1923) (refusing to define an Indian as a "white person" eligible for
naturalization); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194-98 (1922) (holding that a
Japanese person, as a non-white, could be excluded from citizenship under the pertinent
statute). Contra United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 675-77, 688 (1898)
(finding a general rule of universal citizenship by birth in the Fourteenth Amendment).
175. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
176. Id. at 551. (noting that segregation may "stamp[ ] the colored race with a badge
of inferiority" solely because it "chooses to put that construction upon it").
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tion in the provision of public accommodation. 177 With the close of Reconstruction, the Court announced, the time had arrived for blacks to
"cease [ ] to be the special favorite of the laws" for "[m] ere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery."
178 These cases reflect a persistent unwillingness to find significant protection for minorities in the Reconstruction Amendments and an inclination to view minorities as inferior. In the Peonage cases, the Thirteenth
Amendment received an interpretation favoring blacks, even though the
Court could have fallen back on the Civil Rights Cases dictum that the
Amendment "simply abolished slavery."1 79 This exception can be explained by the needs of a laissez-faire ideology straining under the weight
of white proletarian coercion claims. Involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth Amendment proved fortuitously congruent with the notion of coercion in liberty of contract. White supremacy, on the other hand, was
unaffected by the Peonage cases because only minor components of the
Southern labor system were invalidated, 180 and because the cultural image of black incapacity prevailed.
2. The Legal Status of Peonage Statutes and the Use of CriminalSanctions
Upon Breach of an Employment Contract. - A preliminary objection to reopening the inquiry into the Peonage cases might be as follows: Surely
the laws at issue in Bailey and Reynolds, by imposing criminal sanctions for
a worker's breach of an employment contract, constituted peonage by
restraining labor under pain of criminal punishment. They were thus
patently invalid. Why then the need to explain?
The idea that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited criminal sanctions for contract breach was not clearly accepted at the time the Peonage
cases were decided. 181 Peonage had been defined narrowly by the federal courts to require "indebtedness,"' 82 with criminal sanctions for contract breach traditionally distinct from debt. Indentured servitude, which
applied criminal sanctions on breach of contract, persisted at the time in
177. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883).
178. Id. at 25; see also Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 20 (1906) (contending
that the Reconstruction Amendments had not left blacks the "wards of the Nation").

179. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23.
180. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
181. This is certainly not to contend that there would be no arguments available
against the use of criminal sanctions upon contract breach. The Supreme Court in
Robertson v. Baldwin distinguished between involuntary servitude which can exist "lawfully
as a punishment for crime of which the party shall have been duly convicted," as opposed
to criminalizing violation of a "private contract voluntarily made." 165 U.S. 275, 292
(1897) (HarlanJ., dissenting); see also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,175-76 (1908)

("[I]t cannot be . . .that an employer is under any legal obligation, against his will, to
retain an employt .... any more than an employL can be compelled, against his will, to
remain in the personal service of another.").
182. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905) (defining the "basal fact [of
peonage as] indebtedness").
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England,1 8 3 and had been widely accepted in the North until the 1820s
and 1830s.18 4 At the beginning of the twentieth century, three Northern
states-Maine, Minnesota, and Michigan-had false pretenses statutes,
similar to the one invalidated in Bailey.18 5 Further, despite federal
prohibitions forbidding the importation of foreign contract labor, a
highly organized and highly coercive system of debt-based labor prospered alongside the growth of the Western railroads.1 8 6 Contractual provisions threatening criminal sanctions could be found in the maritime
context, where the Supreme Court, in Robertson v. Baldwin, held that the
Thirteenth Amendment had not "introduce[d] any novel doctrine with
respect to certain descriptions of service."18 7 Robertson validated a contract in which "an individual . . . for a valuable consideration, con88
tract[ed] for the surrender of his personal liberty for a definite time.'
Robertson could have been extended to the Freedman's Bureau's equally
traditional use of contracts backed by criminal sanctions. Indeed, the
Freedman's Bureau use of "penal sanctions against idleness and va89
If
grancy" was extended in the North through laws against vagrancy.'
beggars could be compelled "to obey the rules of the market and enter
into transactions of voluntary exchange," 190 blacks could in theory be
forced to adapt to the free market through contracts backed by the criminal law. In sum, contemporary "freedom of contract theory [did] not
speak unambiguously to the baseline question posed, whether breach of
labor contracts may be treated as criminal." 191
Nor was the illegitimate nature of the criminal sanctions for contract
breach evident to Justice Holmes, who dissented in Bailey and concurred
only reluctantly in Reynolds. Holmes argued that restrictions on sanctions
for contract violations harmed workers, who otherwise received higher
183. The United Kingdom maintained forms of indentured servitude until the early
twentieth century. Key among these was the practice of apprenticeship, which in fact
promoted the "upward mobility of workers." Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual
Disempowerment of Employees, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 87, 118 (1993).
184. See RobertJ. Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor: The Employment Relation
in English and American Law and Culture, 1350-1870, at 8 (1991).
185. See Steinfeld, supra note 58, at 157 (noting that these states had "false pretense
labor contract statutes of their own, aimed at enforcing the labor agreements of white
workers who had received transportation advances to remote lumbering, mining, or
railroad construction sites"). But cf. Schmidt, supra note 164, at 705 ("[T]he longaccepted position of the Anglo-American criminal law is that an individual breaching a
contract should not be subject to criminal penalties.").
186. See Gunther Peck, Reinventing Free Labor: Immigrant Padrones and Contract
Laborers in North America, 1885-1925, 83 J. Am. Hist. 848, 869 (1996) (describing "the
North American West [as] a bastion of coercive labor relations in the early twentieth
century").
187. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282, 287-88 (1897) (holding that the
Thirteenth Amendment did not apply to sailors' contracts).
188. Id. at 280.
189. Stanley, supra note 39, at 99-100.
190. Id. at 114.

191. Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 21, at 989.
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wages from employers no longer fearing their flight.192 Holmes noted
that as a rule "the State ... throw[s] its weight on the side of performance."' 9 3 As late as 1944, Justice Reed could unabashedly argue, albeit in
dissent, that a state could "punish the fraudulent procurement of an ad194
vance of wages" as in Bailey.
Finally, neither of the statutes at issue in the Peonage cases directly
penalized contract breach. The false pretenses law in Bailey made acceptance of an advance and the subsequent failure to repay it prima facie
evidence of fraud, while the criminal surety law in Reynolds allowed convicted criminals to have a third party pay their fines in return for the
promise of labor.' 9 5 Both could have fallen within the exception to the
Thirteenth Amendment, which explicitly permitted involuntary servitude
"as a punishment for crime."1 96 A 1867 federal anti-peonage statute forbade "the holding of any person to service or labor to pay a debt due
from the laborer to the employer, when such employ6 desires to leave the
employment before his debt is paid off.'

97

Southern peonage laws, on

the other hand, included a finding of criminality and rested on more
than mere indebtedness. 198 Pursuant to this logic, Alabama District
Court Judge Thomas Goode Jones, one of the leaders of the Justice Department's attack on peonage, 199 upheld the false pretenses law later
struck down in Bailey, on the theory that it did not "coerce the perform'200
ance of civil obligations by criminal penalties.
At the beginning of the Lochner era then, the "place of compulsion in
a free market economy," was still an open question. 20 ' Understanding
the malignant consequences of the peonage laws demanded a contextual
192. An analogous argument was available for the enforcement of indentures. See
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S 219, 246 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Bickel &
Schmidt, supra note 21, at 989-90 (discussing Holmes's views in Bailey).
193. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 247 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
194. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 27 (1944) (Reed, J., dissenting).
195. Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 21, at 856-58, 882-83. Only in Louisiana was
simple breach of an employment contract criminal. See id. at 854.
196. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, §1; see also Lichtenstein, supra note 23, at 2-5
(describing how this exception was used to circumvent the rule against forced labor).
197. Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707, 707 (E.D. Ark. 1905) (quoting the 1867 federal AntiPeonage law).
198. This would also have comported with the emphasis placed by laissez-faire
theorists, not only on the freedom to enter contracts, but also on the ability to choose
upon entering a contractual relation those conditions the parties felt appropriate.
Freedom of contract was the "right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he
deems proper ... [and] the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions
upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it." 2 Cooley, supra
note 79, at 801.
199. See Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, supra note 18, at 44.
200. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 691 (M.D. Ala. 1903). Nonetheless, Judge Goode in
the same case struck down two other Alabama laws as violations of the Thirteenth
Amendment. See id.
201. Stanley, supra note 39, at 115. Some courts thought differently. An Alabama
court struck down one peonage law as a violation of liberty of contract. See Toney v. State,
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analysis of their impact. If the Court had engaged in the formalist analysis of Adair or Coppage, it is easy to imagine the Peonage cases coming out
the other way. Given the Court's proclivity for formalist, acontextual argument and its unwillingness to protect minorities in other cases, the
question can legitimately be posed: Why did the Court decide the way it
did?
3. The Peonage cases. - This section suggests that the Peonage cases
were in fact characterized by the same sort of acontextual analysis used in
other Lochner-era substantive due process cases. Distrusting factual information and the briefs, the Court relied on its stereotypes of black labor to
strike down the false pretenses statute in Bailey and the criminal surety
law in Reynolds.20 2 The use of these techniques, similar to the methodology used in substantive due process cases, provides evidence that the
framework of laissez-faire was the starting point for analysis in the Peonage cases. Hence, the Peonage cases should be seen as appendages to
laissez-faire doctrine, which helps explain their anomalous status in race
relations law.
While in Adair and Coppage, the Court accepted formalist readings of
statutes, in Bailey and Reynolds, it engaged in a reconstruction of what it
believed (more or less accurately) to be the statute's impact based on its
own preconceptions of black labor. 203 In Bailey, Justice Hughes refused
to accept Alabama's insistence upon the formal legitimacy of the false
pretenses law, which allowed juries to convict workers of fraudulently accepting advances absent evidence by creating a presumption of fraudulent intent.20 4 Nor did he look at the actual operation of the statute. As
in Muller, the decision provides no sign of reliance on the briefs, which
here would have included the Justice Department's detailed factual reports on peonage and Bailey's lawyers' insistence upon the racial compo20 5
nent of the laws.

Instead, the Court applied its preconceived categories, in an effort to
imagine the statute's "natural" effect. 20 6 Justice Hughes notes that

"[p]lainly" the law targeted cases "destitute" of possible inference. 20 7 The
"law... did not permit [a defendant] to testify that he did not intend to
37 So. 332, 334 (Ala. 1904) ("Because of the restrictions it purports to place on the right to
make contracts for employment... this act is wholly invalid.").
202. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219
(1911).
203. Of course, "southerners knew [that the false pretenses law was] intended to
maintain white control of the labor system." Cohen, supra note 69, at 34.
204. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 232-33.
205. See Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, supra note 18, at 74-75 (noting that five
"thorough but repetitive" briefs were submitted in Bailey's defense, including an amicus
curiae brief by the Justice Department); id. at 76 (touching on Bailey's lawyers' insistence
on race's importance).
206. 219 U.S. at 238.
207. Id. at 235.
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injure or defraud." 20 8 Justice Hughes imagined Bailey as "stripped" of his
natural rights and "exposed" to the danger of conviction. 20 9 In spite of
Justice Holmes's protest that evidence of the statute's de facto operation
was lacking even in the case at hand, the Court imagined the statute's
"natural and inevitable effect," in a way that it had been unwilling to do in
Adair or Coppage.210 Further, the Court could have invalidated only the
particular application of the statute before it, instead of striking down the
entire statute. Indeed, Justice Holmes, in denying a hearing in the first
Bailey case, suggested that the statute's flaw, if any, lay in its application
rather than its formulation. 2 11 The Court knew that the law's targets
2 12
were black peons, described elsewhere as "helpless and pathetic."
Since blacks fit its preconceived notions of incapacity, it was willing to see
2 13
the laws as extensions of private coercion.
Further, in Reynolds, the Court performed a similar analysis on a convict surety statute, which allowed black criminals to have their fines paid
by white farmers in exchange for labor. 214 Justice Day refused to endorse
a purely formalist understanding of the statute that legitimated the imposition of a penalty pursuant to a criminal conviction. He contended that
the surety was a new contract, not part of a state punishment, even
though the state, through its statute, branded the surety contracts as punishment.2 15 Justice Day also highlighted laborers' initial indebtedness,
unlike the Coppage Court, which had refused to consider workers' initial
208. Id. at 236.
209. Id. at 236.
210. Id. at 238; see Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (refusing to consider
the possibility that workers and employers were unequal). Holmes might have argued that
the evidence of the case at hand provided only enough evidence to invalidate the law as
applied, and not on its face. Hence, the Court should not have struck down a law since it
was only the incompetence of a state prosecutor at issue.
211. Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452, 454 (1908) (noting that if "[w]hen the case
comes to trial ... the prosecution will not rely upon the statutory presumption, but will
exhibit satisfactory proof of a fraudulent scheme," there would be no constitutional
defect).
212. United States v. McClellan, 127 F. 971, 977 (S.D. Ga. 1904).
213. See Soifer, supra note 15, at 273 (arguing that Hughes "could not avoid seeing
poor' and 'ignorant' farm workers").
214. In Reynolds, one Ed Rivers was convicted of petty larceny. To pay his fine and
court costs required sixty-eight days in jail; rather, Rivers chose to work in a surety contract
for nine months and twenty-four days. Deserting before its completion, Rivers was
rearrested, fined again (this time, a penny, but with $87.75 court costs), and again rereleased on a surety, this time for more than fourteen months. See Cohen, supra note 69,
at 54.
215. "[H]ere the State has taken the obligation of another for the fine and costs,
imposed upon one convicted for the violation of the laws of the State.... The surety and
convict have made a new contract for service, in regard to the terms of which the State has
not been consulted." United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149-50 (1914). Justice Day's
reading of the situation departs from the historical facts: The state clearly knew of and
endorsed the second contract. It had written the law with the intention of extracting labor
from blacks, allowing white employers to come into Court and pay the fee; then, the state
inflicted increased fines, as in Rivers's case. in the event of a second breach. The
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positions.21 6 He saw the new contract as a new creation, and the peon's
indebtedness as manufactured by the law, instead of an inevitable background inequality. Again, the only reason to shift from Coppage's analytic
stance was the presence of a group that the Court already perceived as
weak and vulnerable-hence worthy of protection-coupled with the
pressing ideological needs of laissez-faire jurisprudence outlined in
Part

1.217

4. The Holmes Opinions. - Justice Holmes's Bailey dissent and Reynolds concurrence provide the strongest evidence for this reading. By
adopting an "uncharacteristically formalistic" approach, 218 Holmes emphasized that if the statute applied to all contracts, it would be valid. Logically then, it was not the statute itself, but the fact that it was applied
primarily to one vulnerable group that had persuaded the majority. Indeed, in his first Bailey decision, he had noted that the false pretenses law
would be invalid only if "a certain class in the community was mainly affected." 2 19 Absent this evidence, Holmes implied, the Court lacked rea220
sons to invalidate the law.
proposition that the state's stamp of approval was lacking in these schemes was thus
inaccurate.
216. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915) (noting that it is "impossible to
uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same time
recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the
exercise of those rights").
217. While whites, especially Italian immigrants, were also subject to coercive false
pretenses statutes in other parts of the country, the Court's adjudication of a case involving
blacks probably made the striking down of the statute easier to justify. See Bickel &
Schmidt, supra note 21, at 851-53; see also Pete Daniel, Up from Slavery and Down to
Peonage: The Alonzo Bailey Case, 57J. Am. Hist. 654, 656 (1970) (discussing the types of
people enslaved by peonage laws); Peck, supra note 186, at 849-50 (noting that Greeks,
Mexicans, and Italians were also caught in coercive labor relations). There is no pattern
discernable in lower courts' decisions involving different races of peons. Davis v. United
States, for instance, seems to have involved a successful prosecution where the peon was
white. 12 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1926). In another case, in which the defendant "refused to
allow [the white peon] to stop working, and the defendant.., said . .. that [the peon]
must work for Taylor [the defendant] or go on the chain gang," the conviction was
reversed because the threat was never realized. Taylor v. United States, 244 F. 321, 323
(4th Cir. 1917).
218. G. Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self 337
(1993) [hereinafter White, Law and the Inner Self]. Holmes refused to consider the
socioeconomic conditions of false pretenses prosecutions. How else can his defense of the
prima facie standard as "only evidence, [which] may be held by a jury to make out guilt,"
id. at 248, be read? Certainly, this assessment bears no relation to the reality of Southern
justice. See Russell, supra note 22, at 14-25 (discussing the impact of race in criminal
trials).
219. Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452, 454 (1908).
220. The decisions cannot simply be chalked up to Holmes's opposition to substantive
due process. On numerous occasions, Holmes joined the Court in invalidating legislation
under substantive due process grounds. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
413-16 (1922) (recognizing that regulation that goes "too far" will be construed as a
taking). Readings of Justice Holmes's Lochner dissent often overlook the fact that he did
see a role for "fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of
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Dissenting in the Court's second hearing of Bailey, he highlighted
the case's racial content with ironic verve: " [T] he fact that in Alabama it
mainly concerns the blacks does not matter." 221 Immediately after noting
this racial content, he reiterated the majority's reference to Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, a seminal case on disparate racial impact. 222 Holmes thus contrasted the obvious racial content of the law with the fact that the majority
had gone out of its way to deny this racial content proper legal significance. This ironic contrast suggests that Holmes did not take the majority's denial of the importance of race at face value. Rather, he believed
that racial factors had been determinative for the majority. By stressing
the obvious racial context of the law, Holmes was calling the majority's
2 23
bluff, implicitly challenging their putatively race-neutral decision.
Holmes thus indicated his belief that the Court was importing subjective
judgments, specifically, its beliefs that blacks were weak and merited protection, to invalidate a legislative decision. Justice Holmes's Bailey dissent
might be read as an attempt to embarrass the Court, which was leery of
inflaming fresh tensions between North and South, by parading and
224
mocking its implicit use of racial categories.
In Reynolds, Justice Holmes noted that only "impulsive people with
little intelligence or foresight" would be caught in the folds of criminal
surety. 22 5 These words were "the shibboleths of respectable racism in
moderate Northern discourse," 226 and indicated his belief that the law
was being struck down, not necessarily because it was inherently coercive,
but because it was generally applied to a weak and incapable people, who
needed protection from the potentially harsh outcomes of the market.
One biographer, G. Edward White, suggests that Holmes might have distinguished between the permissible criminalization of breaches of labor
contracts, and an impermissible taking "advantage" of "impulsive" laborour people." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see
also Michael J. Phillips, The Substantive Due Process Decisions of Mr. Justice Holmes, 36
Am. Bus. LJ. 437, 450-60 (1999) (noting that, in many instances, Justice Holmes argued
for the invalidation of legislation on due process grounds).
221. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 246 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
222. Id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886) (upholding an equal
protection challenge by "aliens and subjects of the Emperor of China")).
223. Cf. Soifer, supra note 15, at 272 ("Holmes accused the majority of tacitly
assuming that Alabama juries would be prejudiced.").
224. Professor Schmidt notes that the Court was careful to stimulate "the impetus for
sectional reconciliation" and that in every case in which it struck down a piece ofJim Crow,
it avoided "any implication of judicial disapproval." Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 21, at
982, 987 (discussing the involuntary servitude, franchise restriction, and segregation
cases). Schmidt considers but rejects the suggestion that the choice of Hughes as writer of
the Bailey decision, instead of Harlan, who had already professed strong feelings on race,
was an effort on the latter's part to minimize perceived conflict within the Court over the
issue of race. See id. at 863.
225. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914) (Holmes, J., concurring).
226. Schmidt, supra note 164, at 700. Further, Randall Kennedy asserts that Holmes
had a "low regard for blacks [in] general." Kennedy, Race Relations Law, supra note 164,
at 1641
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ers.22 7 For Holmes, the latter is determinative in Reynolds but not Bailey. 228 Hence, in both cases, the Holmes opinions illuminate a consciousness of the racial context, and his belief that it was crucial for the
majorities' decisions. Later peonage decisions, perhaps influenced by
229
Holmes's irony, acknowledged the salience of race.
In conclusion, Bailey and Reynolds do not need to be seen as anomalies in the era of'judicial hostility to racial claims. Rather, they transpired
at a moment when laissez-faire ideology urgently required a definition of
unfree labor to staunch majoritarian cries for redistributive legislation.
The Court's solution to this problem-permitting coercion claims from
only those groups it understood as weak-seeped into the Peonage cases.
Where minorities' claims had been rejected in Plessy v. Ferguson230 and
the Civil Rights Cases,23 1 the pleas of black laborers were heard in Bailey
and Reynolds because such recognition proved congruent with the ideological necessities of laissez-faire. For an instant, black subordination was
remedied, not for the sake of justice or equality, but for ideological coherence. Other scholars have noted similar contemporaneous moments
of interest convergence. According to Professor David Bernstein, freedom of contract jurisprudence also "protected African Americans from
facially neutral legislation that restricted their access to, and mobility in,
the labor market."232 He concludes that such protection was "a fortuitous by-product of Lochnerism's hostility to special-interest legislation
rather than a product of a conscious decision by the courts to protect
these groups. ' 23 3 A focus upon the Peonage cases, however, counsels for
a less sanguine view of fortuitous judicial aid. 23 4 The practical effects of
decisions concerning peonage for blacks were limited since "peonage
continued, not only in Alabama but throughout the South." 235 The Pe227. White, Law and the Inner Self, supra note 218, at 339.
228. One remaining question is why Holmes would dissent in Bailey and concur in
Reynolds, since substantively the same sort of law was involved in both cases. White, not
particularly helpfully, suggests that the two decisions reflect the tension between his
positivism and "his interest in exposing the practical consequences of legal rules." Id.
229. E.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 15 (1944) ("He [the peon] was an illiterate
Negro laborer in the toils of the law for the want of $5.").
230. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
231. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
232. David E. Bernstein, Only One Place of Redress: African Americans, Labor
Regulations, & the Courts from Reconstruction to the New Deal 7 (2001).
233. Id. at 115.
234. Professor Bernstein also argues that the history of freedom of contract
jurisprudence also casts doubt on the "purported social benefits of the modern regulatory
state." Id. at 116. Unlike Professor Bernstein's work, this Note contains insight into
neither the public choice dynamics of economic legislation, nor the relative possibilities of
conflict and cooperation between various subaltern groups.
235. Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, supra note 18, at 79; see also Kennedy, Race Relations
Law, supra note 164, at 1648 ("[A] thick web of peonage-like legal arrangements were left
untouched by Bailey and its immediate progeny."). Hence the Court "perpetuat[ed] racial
subordination in practice while paying deference to the formalities of equal treatment
under the law." Id. at 1649.
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onage cases as rules of law for "many agricultural workers . .. proved
impotent,"23 6 especially as those U.S. Attorneys who continued to work
on peonage cases received little aid from the Justice Department. 237 The
Peonage cases thus provided a way for the Court to cement the cohesion
and integrity of laissez-faire jurisprudence at minimal cost to white
supremacy.
B. The Continuing Relevance of the Peonage Cases' Logic: Kozminski
If the Court's preconceived categories determined who would receive Thirteenth Amendment protection, a dearth of jurisprudence
might follow naturally. As the Court abandoned blatantly prejudicial
views, and its perception of subordinate groups as weaker withered, Thirteenth Amendment protection of the latter died on the vine. 23 8 Further,
by the end of the 1930s, the Court had ceased to review economic legislation. 23 9 And yet, the persistence of the aforementioned model is apparent in a 1988 Supreme Court decision construing the Thirteenth Amend-

236. Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, supra note 18, at 80. Daniel begins his account by
criticizing the "inability of federal, state, and local law-enforcement officials to end
peonage." Id. at xi.
237. See id. at 148; see also id. at 110-31 (describing the manifold difficulties of a
peonage prosecution in Georgia).
238. According to Risa Goluboff, another reason for this change was the shift in the
NAACP's litigation strategy in the 1940s. See Risa L. Goluboff, A Road Not Taken: The
Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 Duke LJ. (forthcoming
April 2001) (manuscript at 5-6, on file with the Columbia Law Review). The Court decided
one major case under the Thirteenth Amendment since its skirmishes with peonage, a case
that ended up as a lonely, little-cited outlier in constitutional jurisprudence. See Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that racial discrimination in the real
and personal property market could be regulated by Congress under the Thirteenth
Amendment); Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 Harv.
L. Rev. 1294, 1300 (1969) ("The [T]hirteenth [A]mendment as it appears to have been
originally understood bears little relation to the "new" [T] hirteenth [A] mendment applied
in Jones.).
For examples of other cases decided under the Thirteenth Amendment, see, e.g.,
United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1450 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that withholding
passports and airline tickets while indigent immigrants worked off the cost of travel
violated the Thirteenth Amendment);Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 1966)
(holding that state mental institution personnel who subjected an inmate to conditions
like involuntary servitude could be held liable under civil rights statutes).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938) (outlining limited categories that would trigger heightened judicial scrutiny, and
conspicuously omitting economic regulation); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 391 (1937) (upholding the validity of a Washington minimum wage statute and
rejecting the constitutionalization of freedom of contract).
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ment through its statutory armatures 18 U.S.C. § 241
and 18 U.S.C.
24 1
§ 1584,240 a decision entitled United States v. Kozminski.
Kozminski concerned the criminal prosecution of farmers who had
held by force and threats, and then extracted labor from, two mentally
handicapped individuals. Justice O'Connor held that the standard for
involuntary servitude under these statutes was the "use or threatened use
of physical or legal coercion." 242 Noting that the "exact range of conditions [the Amendment] prohibits is hard[ ] to define," provoking
problems of notice in the use of criminal sanctions, 243 she "abruptly concluded that psychological coercion would not satisfy its test."24 4 Further,
she rejected definitions of involuntary servitude that encompassed psychological coercion or "slavelike conditions" because of the same rule of
law problem. 245 Her standard thus attempted to exclude uncertainty in
246
the definition of coercion by avoiding a subjective definition.
Nevertheless, it is far from clear that the majority's standard does exclude subjective judgments. Defining legal coercion requires that courts
confront a baseline problem: Determining when the exercise of a legal
right is coercive. 247 One problem is that a law might be only part of the
reason for accepting work. Where the law plays a part in coercing work,
but other factors also play a role, the Court might have to determine

240. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988) (criminalizing conspiracies to "injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District in the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution . . .");
18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1988) (penalizing a person who "knowingly and willfully holds to
involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person
for any term .... ). The Court deems that the "Congress intended the phrase to have the
same meaning in both places. . . ." United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 945 (1988).
241. 487 U.S. at 931.
242. Id. at 953. The Court explicitly drew "no conclusions ... about the potential
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment." Id. at 944.
243. Id. at 942, 949-55. Contra Kares, supra note 2, at 390 ("The use of the criminal
standard in federal tort cases achieves the same effect as the stringent requirements for
bringing civil rights actions under § 1985(3): it limits the availability of a constitutional
tort.").
244. ScottJ. Gorsline, Casenote, Criminal Law-Involuntary Servitude, 66 U. Det. L.
Rev. 297, 304 (1989).
245. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 951 (1988). Justice O'Connor
describes as "inherently legislative" the task of "determining what type of coercive activities
are so morally reprehensible that they should be punished as crimes" since there is "no
objective indication of the conduct or condition they prohibit." Id. at 949.
246. In addition, the Court wanted to assuage problems of notice in Kozminski itself.
See id. at 942-44.
247. See id. at 931, 948. For a brief discussion of this problem, see supra note 113. A
legal realist view of law might require the Court to acknowledge that law, in the form of
property right allocations-particularly the property of others-always restricts options.
Law is hence always a partial constraint. See Hale, Coercion and Distribution, supra note
113, at 473.
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whether the subjective reasons for submitting to the threat pertained to
248
the exercise of the legal right or to non-legal factors.
However, Justice O'Connor's opinion contains sub rosa strands of
another analytic technique for closeting coercion, one with roots in the
Lochner era. Rather than examining the plaintiffs subjective view of the
coercion in question, the Court categorized victims into different classes
based on the Court's conception of whether the victim was suitably weak
and incapable. Justice O'Connor gave several examples of 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 and § 1584 violations: "children ... stranded in large, hostile cities"; a "child who is told he can go home late at night in the dark through
a strange area"; "an incompetent [threatened with] institutionalization"
and "an immigrant [threatened] with deportation." 249 On the other
hand, "a parent who coerced an adult son or daughter into working in
the family business by threatening withdrawal of affection," could not be
described as coercive. 250 Religious and political leaders who obtain
"work without pay" or "personal services" from adult followers are also
excluded from involuntary servitude prosecution. 251 Finally, an at-will firing was a "beneficial" situation that would be compromised by coercion
liability. 25 2 A common thread illuminates these examples: Only plaintiffs
with special vulnerabilities, or who lack capacity, are protected. 253 The
"vulnerabilities of the victim" and "evidence of other means of coercion"
are not only "relevant," but, given the difficulty of articulating a baseline
for legal coercion, may be determinative. 254 Courts following Kozminski
will inevitably look to these examples, even though they are dicta, to identify legal coercion. The First Circuit, the only circuit yet to analyze Kozminski extensively, has noted the "evidentiary role of the victim's 'special
248. For instance, if an immigrant accepted work rather than returning home, and
was threatened by an employer with a loss of work authorization, would it make a
difference to the Court in a coercion analysis if the immigrant in this case was a welleducated professional from Canada, or a manual laborer from a poorer country which was
suffering from a major civil war? It seems unavoidable that these contextual factors,
besides the type of legal pressure applied, would make a difference in the Court's
adjudication.
249. 487 U.S. at 947-48.
250. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor emphasizes that
this example arose in oral argument, suggesting its importance to the Court.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 950 (agreeing that "[t]he most ardent believer in civil rights legislation
might not think that cause would be advanced by permitting the awful machinery of the
criminal law to be brought into play whenever an employee asserts that his will to quit has
been subdued by a threat which seriously affects his future welfare") (quoting United
States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 487 (2d Cir. 1964)).
253. This occurred in Kozminski. Even though the case was reversed and remanded,
the Court recognized the special weakness of the two "mentally retarded" men held by the
Kozminskis. According to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the I.Q.s of the two
farmhands were 67 and 60. See United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1188 (6th Cir.
1987).
254. Kozminski. 487 U.S. at 952.
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vulnerabilities,"' which the court must draw to the jury's attention. 255
Kozminski hence demands that plaintiffs construct themselves as hapless
victims.
In sum, the Kozminski standard solves the coercion problem by drawing on the Lochner-era's model, thus drastically limiting the scope of Thirteenth Amendment protection. 256 Yet such a constricted definition of
involuntary servitude is not a necessary result. With close scrutiny of the
impact of background economic conditions, courts could proceed in a
case-by-case manner to outline a shared sense of coercion. Even absent
"apparent consensus in society or in the legal community, [the Court]
can often create some kind of agreement in the context of the narrow
case, and through the case enlighten attitudes in the larger community." 257 So long as only parties understood as weak and incapable, such
as the idiot and the child, merit judicial protection, the Thirteenth
258
Amendment will fall far short of its full potential.
255. United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1000-01 n.4 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that
"the jury is to consider the victim's 'special vulnerabilities,' with a view to 'whether the
physical or legal coercion or threats thereof could plausibly have compelled the victim to
serve'").
256. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 376 (1990) (arguing that the Kozminski court did
not accord sufficient weight to fairness values).
257. Id. at 384. Concurring in Kozminzki, Justice Stevens was confident that sufficient
social agreement already existed concerning the meaning of involuntary servitude, that, in
a majority of cases, outcomes would be sufficiently predictable to assuage rule of law
problems. Further, he argued that since "[n]o legal rule .. . produces certainty," a degree
of uncertainty must always be accepted. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 965-66, 967 n.1 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). A standard for coercion could be "developed in the common-law tradition of
case-by-case adjudication." Id. at 965-66.
Justice Stevens's model of legal interpretation abandons the Court's monopoly on the
meaning of coercion and "puts ... emphasis on ordinary understanding and purpose."
Kent Greenawalt, The Nature of Rules and the Meaning of Meaning, 72 Notre Dame L.
Rev., 1449, 1477 (1997). It opens the interpretive inquiry to "individuals attempting to
conform their conduct to the rule of law, prosecutors, and jurors," Kozminski, 487 U.S. at
969 (Stevens, J., concurring), and abandons the idea that "law is something handed down
to the populace by high officials." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Law from the Bottom
Up, 97 W. Va. L. Rev. 141, 142 (1994). Acknowledging the difficulty of articulating a
consistent normative standard for coercion,Justice Stevens urged the Court to broaden the
enterprise of constitutional interpretation, allowing the Court to serve as a prism through
which manifold visions of coercion could be reconciled.
258. Asking people to construe themselves as victims effectively prevents many people
from claiming they have been subject to coercion. "[W]hen blacks are told that they
should not be deploying the use of victimology as a way of articulating demands, they are
essentially being forced into a catch-22." KimberI6 Williams Crenshaw, Color Blindness,
History, and the Law, in The House That Race Built 280, 287 (Wahneema Lubiano ed.,
1997). Justice O'Connor acknowledges, at least implicitly, what Lawrence Sager has called
the "constricted reach of the federal judicial doctrines which govern the enforcement of
constitutional norms." Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1263 (1978). Professor Sager
describes instances where "the Court, because of institutional concerns, has failed to
enforce a provision of the Constitution to its full conceptual boundaries." Id. at 1213.
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CONCLUSION

In his seminal work Whigs and Hunters, E.P. Thompson demonstrated
how law, while initially a mechanism to "mediate existent class relations
to the advantage of the rulers," rapidly develops an independent logic
and evolutionary momentum, to impose "again and again, inhibitions
upon the actions of the rulers." 25 9 This Note has proposed an alternative
interpretation of the Peonage cases that advances Thompson's critique
one further step. Just as hegemonic legal norms might incidentally constrain the actions of the powerful, so might legal forms adopted for the
benefit of subordinate classes be pressed into the service of a ruling class.
The Reconstruction Amendments underwent this same process. One
strain of substantive due process developed into freedom of contract, a
theory that required an understanding of "coercion"-that which could
vitiate an otherwise free contract. This theory required the establishment
of limits to those who could claim legal relief from coercion. Applying
their preconceived notions, the Justices determined that only those presumed to be weak could be coerced, although these preconceived categories changed as culture changed. By extension, to warrant the solicitude
of the Thirteenth Amendment, a party had to show the incapacity and
impulsivity attributed to blacks. Thus, racist assumptions of black incapacity at once constituted the foundation of the laissez-faire market and
the Thirteenth Amendment. Such assumptions persist in the Thirteenth
Amendment's current incarnation. Until these assumptions are rooted
out and refuted, the Thirteenth Amendment will remain a withered and
vestigial constitutional appendage.
259. Thompson, supra note 93, at 264.
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